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Post-Firestone Skirmishes: The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Discretionary Clauses, and Judicial Review 
of ERISA Plan Administrator Decisions 
 
Maria O‘Brien Hylton
*
 
 
Since the Supreme Court's Firestone decision, ERISA plan administrators 
have enjoyed broad discretion and deferential review in benefits claims 
litigation. Language in Firestone that offered discretion and deference in 
exchange for a simple discretionary clause led, in time, to attempts by 
various state insurance commissioners to limit or ban the use of 
discretionary clauses on the ground that they often lead to unjust outcomes 
for plan participants. Various state efforts to inject a degree of fairness into 
the benefits denial review process have been met with preemption 
challenges, however. This article contrasts the Court‘s consistent support 
for discretionary clauses with the thus-far unanimous support of the federal 
courts of appeal for the position that states can ban or limit the use of such 
clauses without running afoul of ERISA's broad preemption language. This 
paper also evaluates the PPACA's requirement of universal and 
independent external review and suggests that, at least in the near term, the 
contested terrain of discretionary clauses will not change significantly. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch,
1
 ERISA plan administrators have largely been insulated from 
de novo review in cases involving denial of benefits. This is because 
Firestone, while acknowledging that Congress did not specify a standard of 
review in civil actions to recover benefits,
2
 concluded that ―a denial of 
benefits . . . is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit 
plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to 
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.‖
3
 The 
now-standard language in most health and disability plans that grants broad 
discretion to the plan administrator is commonly known as a discretionary 
clause and ensures that a reviewing court will use the highly deferential 
―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard in evaluating a denial of benefits.
4
 
While de novo review is still technically available—for example, in cases 
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in which the plan drafters failed to include a discretionary clause
5
—as a 
practical matter, plaintiffs in most benefit denial cases are at a huge 
disadvantage.
6
 Since Firestone, many judges and other commentators have 
bemoaned the enormous difficulty faced by plaintiffs who seem to have a 
strong claim to promised benefits, only to find themselves unable to meet 
the very high bar required for a finding of arbitrary and capricious 
behavior.
7 
In the years following Firestone, employee benefit plan administrators 
in all fifty states quickly inserted discretionary clauses into governing plan 
documents, which has led many state insurance commissioners to attempt 
to limit or ban the use of these clauses.
8
 As with so many other contested 
areas of ERISA, these state efforts to inject a degree of procedural fairness 
into the benefits denial review process have met preemption challenges.
9
 In 
this respect, ongoing litigation about the ability of state insurance 
authorities to ban discretionary clauses is similar to other ERISA battles: 
the state attempts to regulate under the guise of the savings clause in a way 
that it believes will rectify ERISA‘s bias in favor of plan autonomy, after 
which the plan community and insurers respond with a preemption 
challenge.
10
  
In March of 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
11
—sometimes referred to 
colloquially as ―Obama Care.‖ This statute, together with the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act that the President signed into law one 
week later,
12
 amended certain provisions of part A of title XXVII of the 
Public Health Service Act relating to group health plans and health 
insurance issuers of group and individual coverage.
13
 The Departments of 
the Treasury, Labor, and Health & Human Services issued interim final 
regulations in May, June, and July of 2010 that effectively implemented 
new requirements for group health plans and health insurers in both the 
group and individual markets.
14
 The PPACA also added section 715(a)(1) 
to ERISA and section 9815(a)(1) to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) in 
order to incorporate part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act 
into ERISA and the IRC.
15
 The addition of these sections was intended to 
make the statutes applicable to group health plans and health insurance 
providers who offer coverage related to group health plans; however, 
section 1251 of the PPACA provides that certain ―grandfathered plans‖ or 
health insurance coverage existing as of the statute‘s March 2010 
enactment are subject to only some of the PPACA‘s provisions.
16
 As we 
shall see, a plan can lose its grandfathered status if its administrator takes 
certain affirmative steps or fails to take required actions.
17
 Most 
importantly, all plans are now subject to new, complex external review 
requirements that depend on whether they are grandfathered and whether 
they are insured or self-insured.
18
  
The prototype benefits claim litigation involves an employee/participant 
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in an ERISA-regulated welfare plan who seeks payment for a medical 
condition, which may or may not be disabling. The plan administrator, 
operating subject to plan terms that grant broad discretion, determines that 
the participant‘s claim is not payable under the terms of the plan and denies 
the claim. This denial triggers a flurry of specialists‘ reports, independent 
physician evaluations, and other documents that the plan administrator 
considers during the ERISA-mandated internal review.
19
 As of March 
2010, if the internal review results in denial, the participant can request an 
independent external review subject to the applicable state insurance rule
20
 
and the governing plan‘s status.
21
 If no appropriate state process is 
available, the participant may resort to the federal external review 
process.
22
 
Prior to the PPACA, a claimant whose plan was self-insured typically 
had no choice but to pursue a claim in federal court to recover the disputed 
benefit under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B).
23
 Some insured plans were 
subject to Rush-type external review requirements, such as an independent 
medical review of benefit denials, depending upon applicable state 
insurance regulations.
24
 Participants in insured plans could sue to recover 
promised benefits as well.
25
 
This article examines the development of discretionary clauses and 
contrasts the Supreme Court‘s consistent support for these clauses with the 
(thus far) unanimous support by the courts of appeals for the position that 
states can limit or ban such clauses without running afoul of ERISA‘s 
broad preemption language. It also considers the PPACA‘s requirement of 
universal independent external review and suggests that, at least in the short 
term, the contested terrain of discretionary clauses will not change much.   
Although there is at present no conflict among the circuits (which 
would normally increase the likelihood that the Supreme Court would take 
up a discretionary clause/preemption case
26
), it seems likely that the high 
court will soon have occasion to consider whether ERISA preempts efforts 
to regulate discretionary clauses; in addition, the PPACA‘s new rules 
imposing external review requirements on non-grandfathered group health 
plans and health insurance issuers offering group or individual health 
insurance coverage
27
 are certain to complicate matters for both plans and 
claimants.
28
 Should the Court continue to favor the use of discretionary 
clauses, the states will once again find themselves in the familiar position 
of trying to employ devices to regulate ERISA insurance plans that are 
immune from attack on preemption grounds but that now also have to 
comply with the requirements of the PPACA. 
This paper argues that an independent external review process that 
would correct and/or avoid the kinds of defects that Firestone deference has 
engendered would be superior to the current regime, which promises a high 
degree of deference to plan administrators at the occasional expense of 
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fairness for claimants. It remains to be seen, however, whether the kind of 
external review mandated by the PPACA interim final regulations will 
provide both the operational simplicity that plans need and the substantive 
fairness that claimants hope for. 
 
I. THE ERISA FRAMEWORK AND JUDICIAL REVIEW SINCE 
FIRESTONE 
A. ERISA AND BENEFITS CLAIM LITIGATION 
Under § 3(1), ERISA regulates welfare benefit plans that provide 
―medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of 
sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment‖ through the 
purchase of insurance.
29
 Congress enacted ERISA to protect the ―interests 
of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by 
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for 
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate 
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal Courts.‖
30
 ERISA § 
502(a)(1)(B) allows plan participants and beneficiaries to bring a civil 
action in federal court to recover their benefits, enforce their rights, or 
clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
31
  
Congress ensured that employee benefit regulation would be 
―exclusively a federal concern‖ by enacting ―expansive pre-emption 
provisions‖ under ERISA § 514.
32
 Section 514(a) states that ERISA ―shall 
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate 
to any employee benefit plan.‖
33
 However, Congress retained an exception 
to § 514(a) by providing in § 514(b)(2)(A) that ―[n]othing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law 
of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.‖
34
 Section 
514(b)(2)(A), commonly known as the ―savings clause,‖
35
 protects state 
laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities from ERISA‘s pre-
emption scheme. Congress qualified this statutory exception in § 
514(b)(2)(B), also known as the ―deemer clause,‖ stating that ―[n]either an 
employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall 
be deemed to be an insurance company . . . for purposes of any law of any 
State purporting to regulate insurance companies.‖
36
 Specifically, § 
514(b)(2)(B) preempts state insurance laws from regulating self-funded 
ERISA plans on the ground that such plans are not insured and may not be 
deemed to be insurance companies within the meaning of the savings 
clause.
37
 Therefore, the deemer clause limits the reach of the savings clause 
and fortifies ERISA‘s preemption provisions. 
Although ERISA establishes a broad pre-emption scheme under § 514 
and sets out civil enforcement provisions in § 502, the statute does not 
specify what standard of review applies to benefit determinations by plan 
fiduciaries under § 502(a)(1)(B). ERISA merely states in § 503(2) that an 
employee benefit plan shall provide a full and fair review by the 
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appropriate fiduciary of a benefits claim denial.
38
  
It is not surprising that plan drafters have taken advantage of ERISA‘s 
unspecified standard of review regarding benefit denials by inserting 
discretionary clauses into plan terms that instruct judges to defer to the plan 
administrator‘s decisions. Recent cases have raised the question of whether 
state regulations banning discretionary clauses are a valid exercise of the 
state power to regulate insurance, and whether courts must apply the plan‘s 
deferential standard of review or evaluate benefit denials de novo. The 
following section summarizes the relevant Supreme Court decisions on 
discretionary clauses.  
 
B. THE SUPREME COURT LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR DISCRETIONARY 
CLAUSES 
Commentators who have discussed the proliferation of discretionary 
clauses in ERISA-regulated plans have generally taken the Supreme 
Court‘s 1989 decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch as their 
starting point.
39
 John Langbein argued in ―Trust Law as Regulatory Law: 
The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials under 
ERISA,‖ that Firestone ―all but invited [bad faith benefit denials by 
allowing plan sponsors] to impose self-serving terms that severely restrict 
the ability of a reviewing court to correct a wrongful benefit denial.‖
40
  
In Firestone, several former Firestone Tire employees sought severance 
benefits under a termination pay plan after Firestone sold the plants where 
they worked to Occidental Petroleum Company.
41
 Firestone, acting as the 
plan administrator and fiduciary, denied the employees‘ severance benefits 
because Occidental rehired them for the same positions without reduction 
in work or pay.
42
 Under the terms of the termination pay plan, a reduction 
in work was a requirement for severance benefit eligibility.
43
 As the case 
turned on an assessment of Firestone‘s benefit denial, the Supreme Court 
sought to clarify the ―appropriate standard of judicial review of benefit 
determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA.‖
44
  
Looking to principles of trust law, the Supreme Court held that de novo 
is the appropriate standard of review of benefit denials challenged under 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), ―unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or 
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to 
construe the terms of the plan.‖
45
 Discretionary clauses require courts to 
review benefit denials under an abuse of discretion standard.
46
 The Court 
emphasized that de novo is the default standard of review ―regardless of 
whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or 
actual conflict of interest,‖
47
 such as an insurance company that acts as 
payor of benefits and evaluator of benefit claims.
48
 If, however, a plan 
grants discretionary authority to an administrator or fiduciary who is 
operating under a conflict of interest, the courts must weigh that conflict 
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―as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.‖
49
  
Langbein and others have criticized Firestone as making it easier for 
plan administrators to deny claims because of the availability of deferential 
review in the courts.
50
 Mark DeBofsky has also argued that Firestone 
changed the relationship between insurers and insureds by permitting 
insurers to include favorable terms in their insurance policies, which 
deprive benefit claimants of plenary review in the courts.
51
 DeBofsky 
concluded that Firestone ultimately undermined claimants‘ rights under 
employee benefit plans by making those rights depend on ―the degree of 
discretion lodged in the administrator.‖
52
  
The Supreme Court appeared to shift away from Firestone in Rush 
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran. In Rush, Moran sought reimbursement for 
a surgery as ―medically necessary‖ under the Illinois HMO Act.
53
 Through 
her husband, Moran was the beneficiary of an employer-sponsored and 
ERISA-governed welfare benefit plan.
54
 The plan contracted with Rush to 
provide medical services to plan participants and their beneficiaries.
55
 The 
plan also granted Rush the ―broadest possible discretion‖ to determine 
whether a medical service is covered under the plan as ―medically 
necessary.‖
56
  
By contrast, the Illinois HMO Act sought to regulate the decision 
making of health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
57
 The Illinois statute 
required HMOs to provide an independent medical review if a plan 
participant or beneficiary‘s primary care physician and the HMO disagreed 
on the medical necessity of a procedure.
58
 The Act stated that the HMO 
―shall provide the covered service‖ if the independent reviewer determines 
it to be medically necessary.
59
  
Moran‘s primary care physician recommended she undergo surgery, but 
Rush refused to pay for the procedure on the ground that it was not 
medically necessary.
60
 Rush continued to deny Moran‘s claim even after an 
independent reviewer concluded that the surgery was medically 
necessary.
61
 Moran consequently had the surgery at her own expense and 
sued Rush in state court under the Illinois HMO Act.
62
 Rush removed the 
case to federal court, arguing that Moran‘s claim for benefits was 
―completely preempted by ERISA‘s civil enforcement provisions.‖
63
 The 
relevant legal question was whether the Illinois HMO Act contravenes 
ERISA‘s enforcement scheme, as well as Firestone deference, by requiring 
that an independent physician review the benefit denial de novo. 
The Supreme Court held that the Illinois HMO Act ―does not implicate 
ERISA‘s enforcement scheme at all, and is no different from the types of 
substantive plan regulation of insurance contracts we have in the past 
permitted to survive preemption.‖
64
 The Court reasoned that although the 
Illinois statute precludes deferential review, ―this effect of eliminating an 
insurer‘s autonomy to guarantee terms congenial to its own interests is the 
stuff of garden variety insurance regulation through the imposition of 
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standard policy terms.‖
65
 The Court found that the Illinois statute survives 
under ERISA‘s savings clause because it is ―hard to imagine a reservation 
of state power to regulate insurance that would not be meant to cover 
restrictions of the insurer‘s advantage in this kind of way.‖
66
  
The Rush Court weakened discretionary clauses by explicitly taking the 
view that state insurance regulation ―is not preempted merely because it 
conflicts with substantive plan terms.‖
67
 The Court noted that there were 
clear limits on the enforceability of discretionary clauses, as nothing in 
ERISA permits insurers to ―displace any state regulation simply by 
inserting a contrary term in plan documents. This interpretation would 
virtually rea[d] the saving clause out of ERISA.‖
68
 The Court emphasized 
that ―the independent reviewer‘s de novo examination of the benefit claim 
mirrors the general or default rule we have ourselves recognized [in 
Firestone].‖
69
 
Notably, the Rush Court declined to clarify ―the degree to which a plan 
provision for unfettered discretion in benefit determinations guarantees 
truly deferential review.‖
70
 The Court found instead that Rush did not 
require an answer to this question.
71
 Instead, Rush emphasized, ―We have 
read [ERISA] to require a uniform judicial regime of categories of relief 
and standards of conduct, not a uniformly lenient regime of reviewing 
benefit determinations.‖
72
 While the Court noted that discretionary clauses 
are ―simply a matter of plan design or the drafting of an HMO contract‖ 
and are not required by ERISA,
73
 it was silent about the extent of judicial 
deference when a court reviews a discretionary decision of a plan 
administrator who both funds the plan and evaluates benefit claims.
74
  
The Supreme Court finally addressed the conflicted plan administrator 
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn in 2008. Glenn involved a challenge 
to an adverse benefit determination where the decision maker acted as both 
plan administrator and insurer.
75
 Respondent Wanda Glenn was employed 
by Sears and was diagnosed with a heart condition, the symptoms of which 
included fatigue and shortness of breath.
76
 Glenn also participated in an 
ERISA-governed long-term disability insurance plan through Sears.
77
 
Petitioner MetLife served as the plan administrator and insurer.
78
 The plan 
granted MetLife discretion to determine eligibility for benefits and to pay 
valid benefit claims.
79
  
Glenn applied for disability benefits in 2000, and MetLife approved the 
claim for an initial 24-month period because Glenn could not perform her 
job duties.
80
 MetLife also directed Glenn to a law firm that would help her 
apply for Social Security benefits.
81
 In 2002, an administrative law judge 
found that Glenn‘s disability prevented her from performing any jobs for 
which she could qualify and which exist ―in significant numbers in the 
national economy.‖
82
 As a result, the Social Security Administration 
granted Glenn permanent disability benefits retroactive to 2000.
83
 Glenn, 
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however, kept none of the retroactive benefits because three-quarters went 
to MetLife to offset its more generous plan benefits, and the rest went to 
Glenn‘s lawyers.
84
  
In order to receive plan disability benefits beyond the 24-month period, 
Glenn had to show that her disability prevented her from performing her 
job and ―the material duties of any gainful occupation for which she was 
‗reasonably qualified.‘‖
85
 MetLife refused to extend Glenn‘s disability 
benefits because it found that she could perform full-time sedentary work.
86
 
Glenn subsequently filed a federal lawsuit challenging MetLife‘s denial of 
benefits.
87
 The district court denied relief and Glenn appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.
88
 The Sixth Circuit applied Firestone deference 
in its review because the plan explicitly granted MetLife discretion to 
determine eligibility for benefits.
89
 The court also treated MetLife‘s conflict 
of interest as a relevant factor.
90
  
The Sixth Circuit set aside MetLife‘s denial of benefits because of the 
conflict of interest and other issues.
91
 MetLife sought review before the 
Supreme Court on the question of whether a plan administrator who 
evaluates and pays benefit claims operates under a conflict of interest.
92
 
The Solicitor General suggested that the Supreme Court also consider how 
conflicts of interest are to be taken into account in reviewing discretionary 
benefit determinations.
93
 The Court granted certiorari on both questions.
94
 
The case turned on the interpretation of the Firestone principle that a 
fiduciary‘s conflict of interest must be weighed as a factor in determining 
whether there is an abuse of discretion.
95
 The first question that the Court 
addressed was whether a plan administrator who evaluates and pays benefit 
claims operates under the kind of conflict of interest to which the Court 
referred in Firestone.
96
 The Court determined that the plan administrator 
was indeed conflicted.
97
 The Court also acknowledged that a conflict of 
interest exists in the case of an employer who both funds the plan and 
evaluates benefit claims.
98
 Not surprisingly, then, the Court held that judges 
must consider an employer‘s conflict of interest in reviewing discretionary 
benefit determinations.
99
  
MetLife argued that an employer who funds and administers a plan has 
implicitly approved the resulting conflict of interest.
100
 The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument based on principles of trust law.
101
 The Glenn Court 
noted that nothing in trust law requires a judge to forgo careful scrutiny 
even if the settlor has approved a trustee‘s conflict of interest.
102
 In 
response, MetLife pointed out that the Supreme Court need not follow 
principles of trust law where trust law conflicts with ERISA‘s language, 
structure, and purpose.
103
 Specifically, MetLife argued that to find a 
conflict of interest frustrates Congressional efforts to avoid complex review 
procedures and encourage employers to create benefit plans.
104
 MetLife 
also claimed that to find a conflict of interest violates 29 U.S.C. § 
1108(c)(3), permitting employers to administer their own plans.
105
 The 
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Court again rejected MetLife‘s arguments and concluded that, ―taken 
together, we believe them outweighed by ‗Congress‘s desire to offer 
employees enhanced protection for their benefits.‘‖
106
 
The Court next considered whether a conflict of interest exists where an 
insurance company acts as the plan administrator and has discretionary 
authority to evaluate and pay benefit claims.
107
 Once again, the Court found 
three reasons for a conflict of interest.
108
 First, an employer choosing a plan 
administrator would typically prefer an insurance company with low rates 
to one with accurate claims processing;
109
 second, ERISA imposes clear 
duties of care and loyalty on insurers to act in the best interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries;
110
 and third, ―a legal rule that treats 
insurance company administrators and employers alike with respect to the 
existence of a conflict of interest can nonetheless take account of 
circumstances‖ that diminish the conflict.
111
 Noting that insurers have a 
strong incentive to provide accurate claims processing because the 
marketplace punishes companies that offer subpar insurance products,
112
 
the Court suggested this market pressure might reduce ―the significance or 
severity of the conflict in individual cases.‖
113
  
The Supreme Court next examined how judges should account for a 
conflict of interest in reviewing discretionary benefit determinations.
114
 The 
Court reiterated its holding in Firestone that courts must weigh a conflict of 
interest as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.
115
 
The Court also clarified that the mere presence of a conflict of interest 
implies no change in the standard of review from deferential to de novo 
review.
116
 Instead, judges must continue to apply a deferential standard 
where conflicted trustees make discretionary decisions.
117
 At the same time, 
judges must also consider a trustee‘s conflict of interest in determining if 
there has been an abuse of discretion.
118
  
The Court refused to overturn Firestone ―by adopting a rule that in 
practice could bring about near universal review by judges de novo—i.e., 
without deference—of the lion‘s share of ERISA plan claims denials.‖
119
 
The Court declined to take such an action without more explicit guidance 
from Congress.
120
 The Court also refused to create special burden-of-proof 
rules in cases where there is a conflict of interest.
121
 Instead, the Court held 
that conflicts of interest are ―but one factor among many that a reviewing 
judge must take into account.‖
122
 Finally, the Court acknowledged that, in 
some instances, a conflict of interest could prove more important because 
circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that the conflict affected a 
benefit decision.
123
 In other instances, a conflict of interest could prove less 
important because the administrator ―has taken active steps to reduce 
potential bias and to promote accuracy,‖ such as imposing penalties for 
inaccurate decision-making.
124
 The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the 
judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
125
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In 2010, the high court once again took up discretionary clauses in 
Conkright v. Frommert.
126
 In Conkright, respondents left Xerox‘s employ 
in the 1980s, received lump sum distributions of their retirement benefits, 
and later returned to work at Xerox.
127
 To calculate respondents‘ current 
benefits and avoid paying the same benefits twice, the administrator 
interpreted Xerox‘s pension plan to require an approach known as the 
―phantom account‖ method.
128
 The method calculated the hypothetical 
growth of respondents‘ past distributions if the money had remained in 
Xerox‘s investment funds, and reduced respondents‘ current benefits 
accordingly.
129
 The administrator had general authority under the plan to 
construe the plan terms.
130
  
Respondents challenged the phantom account method in administrative 
proceedings.
131
 After the administrator denied the challenge, respondents 
sued in federal court under ERISA.
132
 The district court applied a 
deferential standard of review to the administrator‘s interpretation of the 
plan terms and granted summary judgment for the plan.
133
 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the district court‘s 
decision, holding that the ―Plan Administrator's interpretation was 
unreasonable and that respondents had not been adequately notified that the 
phantom account method would be used to calculate their benefits.‖
134
 
On remand, the plan administrator proposed a different approach to 
calculate the present value of past distributions using an interest rate ―that 
was fixed at the time of the distribution.‖
135
 Unlike the phantom account 
method, which ―calculated the present value of a past distribution based on 
events that occurred after the distribution was made,‖ the new approach 
calculated the ―current value of the distribution based on information that 
was known at the time of the distribution.‖
136
 The district court did not 
apply a deferential standard of review to the new approach and rejected the 
plan administrator‘s interpretation of the plan.
137
 Instead, the district court 
found that the plan was ambiguous and adopted the respondents‘ 
approach.
138
 This approach did not account for the time value of money and 
reduced respondents‘ present benefits ―only by the nominal amount of their 
past distributions—thereby treating a dollar distributed to respondents in 
the 1980‘s as equal in value to a dollar distributed today.‖
139
 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding that the district court did 
not err in refusing to apply a deferential standard of review and did not 
abuse discretion.
140
 
The Supreme Court agreed to consider two questions: first, whether the 
district court owed deference to the administrator‘s interpretation of the 
plan on remand; and second, whether the court of appeals properly deferred 
to the district court on the merits.
141
 However, the Supreme Court found it 
necessary to address only the first question.
142
 The Court first considered 
the Second Circuit‘s rule that a court can forfeit deferential review if it 
previously found that an administrator‘s interpretation of plan terms 
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violated ERISA.
143
 The Court rejected the Second Circuit‘s rule as having 
no basis in Firestone or in the terms of the plan.
144
 Firestone, the Court 
noted, established a broad standard of deference ―without any suggestion 
that the standard was susceptible to ad hoc exceptions like the one adopted 
by the Court of Appeals.‖
145
 Moreover, the Court had recently refused in 
Glenn to create exceptions to the Firestone standard, holding that even a 
systemic conflict of interest does not strip the plan administrator of 
deference.
146
 In light of Glenn, the Conkright Court declined to say that an 
administrator‘s ―single honest mistake‖ in choosing the method of 
calculating benefits ―would require a different result.‖
147
 
The Conkright Court also looked to principles of trust law, but 
determined that trust law ―is unclear on the narrow question before us.‖
148
 
Instead, the Supreme Court found that the guiding principles underlying 
ERISA resolved the issue in the case.
149
 According to the Court, Firestone 
deference protects important Congressional interests relating to employee 
benefit plans.
150
 Deference preserves the balance in ERISA between 
ensuring enforcement of plan rights and encouraging plan creation.
151
 
Additionally, deference ―promotes efficiency by encouraging resolution of 
benefits disputes through internal administrative proceedings rather than 
costly litigation.‖
152
 Finally, deference protects interests in predictability 
and uniformity by ―helping to avoid a patchwork of different interpretations 
of a plan, like the one here.‖
153
 In other words, nothing in Glenn or 
Conkright suggests that the Court is losing its enthusiasm for Firestone 
deference. Nonetheless, Justice Breyer dissented sharply from the Court‘s 
opinion.
154
  
Thus, the current rule on discretionary clauses is that plans may give 
their fiduciaries discretionary authority to evaluate claims and pay benefits. 
This grant of discretion will trigger deferential review in the event that a 
claimant objects to a denial. In cases of conflict this standard of review is 
not automatically altered from deferential to de novo. Rather, it is but one 
factor that courts must consider in determining if there has been an abuse of 
discretion by the fiduciary. Since Firestone, and in the absence of explicit 
guidance from Congress, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the 
validity of discretionary clauses and the deferential standard of review in 
examining benefit decisions, even in cases of conflict. The PPACA 
unquestionably represents new guidance from Congress in this area, 
although it only indirectly addresses the problem of Firestone deference by 
creating independent external review for all plan participants.
155
 The new 
statute does directly tackle the problem of conflicted decision making by 
insisting on impartial, external reviewers in benefits denial cases.
156
 
Whether the post-PPACA reviews will in fact be independent and beyond 
the scope of insurer influence remains to be seen. 
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II. IMPLICIT SUPPORT FOR DE NOVO REVIEW 
A. AN EMERGING CONSENSUS IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS 
Henry Quillen has argued that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Rush 
―catalyzed an organized response to discretionary clauses by state insurance 
regulators.‖
157
 The response in many cases was to ban the clauses for 
insured (but not for self-insured)
158
 plans. This response to the near-
universal use of discretionary clauses has predictably led to several 
challenges in the courts of appeals.  
In American Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, the Sixth Circuit upheld 
Michigan‘s ban on discretionary clauses in insurance contracts and 
policies.
159
 The insurance industry argued that the rules are preempted by § 
514(a) of ERISA and do not fall ―within the ambit of ERISA‘s savings 
clause.‖
160
 The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and held that 
Michigan‘s rules avoid federal preemption because they are state laws 
regulating insurance and consequently fall ―within the ambit of ERISA‘s 
savings clause.‖
161
  
The Sixth Circuit first considered whether Michigan‘s rules barring 
discretionary clauses are, in fact, state laws that regulate insurance within 
the meaning of ERISA‘s savings clause.
162
 The Sixth Circuit applied the 
Supreme Court‘s test in Kentucky Ass‘n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller
163
 to 
determine whether Michigan‘s rules regulated insurance under ERISA‘s 
savings clause.
164
 In Miller, the Supreme Court held that state laws must be 
specifically directed toward the insurance industry and substantially affect 
the risk-pooling arrangement between insurers and insureds to fall within 
the savings clause.
165
 State laws are directed toward the insurance industry 
if they regulate ―insurers with respect to their insurance practices.‖
166
 The 
appellate court determined that Michigan‘s rules are specifically directed 
toward the insurance industry because they regulate only the rights of 
insurers ―to engage in the business of insurance in Michigan.‖
167
 In 
addition, Michigan‘s rules substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement 
because they change the terms of enforceable contracts and alter ―the scope 
of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds.‖
168
  
The insurance industry then argued that ERISA‘s civil enforcement 
scheme under § 502 preempts Michigan‘s rules banning discretionary 
clauses, even if the rules fall under the savings clause.
169
 The industry 
asserted that ERISA preempted state laws that provide a cause of action for 
plan benefits ―outside of, or in addition to, ERISA‘s remedial scheme.‖
170
 
The court rejected this argument, finding that Michigan‘s rules do not 
conflict with ERISA‘s civil enforcement provisions because the rules ―do 
not authorize any form of relief in state courts‖ and ―at most may affect the 
standard of judicial review.‖
171
 The insurance industry also challenged 
Michigan‘s rules on the ground that they conflict with ―ERISA‘s policy of 
ensuring a set of uniform rules for adjudicating cases.‖
172
 The Sixth Circuit 
rejected this argument as well because ERISA could not preempt a state 
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law requiring de novo review as ―the de novo standard of review is already 
the default standard in ERISA cases‖ after Firestone.
173
  
Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Glenn supported the holding in Ross that ERISA does not preempt 
Michigan‘s law.
174
 The Glenn Court held that a conflict of interest arising 
from an entity‘s dual role as plan administrator and payor of plan benefits is 
―but one factor among many‖ that judges must consider in reviewing a 
discretionary benefit determination.
175
 In light of Glenn‘s holding, the Sixth 
Circuit found it ―difficult to understand why a State should not be allowed 
to eliminate the potential for such a conflict of interest by prohibiting 
discretionary clauses in the first place.‖
176
  
In Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, the Ninth Circuit followed the Sixth 
Circuit‘s decision in Ross to uphold Montana‘s ban on discretionary 
clauses.
177
 The facts in Morrison closely resemble those in Ross. Montana 
law required its insurance commissioner to disapprove any insurance form 
that contained ―inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clauses . . . which 
deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage 
of the contract.‖
178
 Montana‘s Commissioner of Insurance, John Morrison, 
interpreted the statute as requiring him to disapprove any insurance contract 
that contained a discretionary clause.
179
 Accordingly, Commissioner 
Morrison denied Standard Insurance Company‘s request for approval of 
proposed disability insurance forms that contained discretionary clauses.
180
 
Standard sued in district court and challenged Morrison‘s practice as 
preempted by ERISA.
181
 The district court granted summary judgment to 
Morrison and Standard appealed.
182
  
The legal issue on appeal was simply whether ERISA preempted 
Commissioner Morrison‘s practice of denying insurance forms with 
discretionary clauses.
183
 Because Morrison‘s practice related to ERISA-
governed employee benefit plans, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
practice is preempted unless it falls under the savings clause pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2).
184
 The Ninth Circuit applied the two-pronged Miller 
test to determine if Morrison‘s disapproval of discretionary clauses came 
within the reach of the savings clause.
185
 The Ninth Circuit found that 
Morrison‘s practice satisfied both requirements and survived ERISA 
preemption.
186
 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit rejected each 
of the following five arguments—two in the first prong and three in the 
second—raised by Standard.  
Standard first argued that Morrison‘s practice of banning discretionary 
clauses is not specifically directed toward the insurance industry because it 
targets ERISA plans and procedures.
187
 The Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument, finding instead that ERISA plans are also a form of insurance 
and that Morrison‘s practice regulated insurance by limiting the terms that 
insurance companies could include in their policies.
188
 In its holding, the 
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Ninth Circuit expressly agreed with the Sixth Circuit in Ross, which held 
that rules imposing conditions on an insurer‘s right to engage in the 
business of insurance within a particular state are directed toward the 
insurance industry.
189
  
Second, Standard suggested that Commissioner Morrison‘s practice 
was still not specifically directed toward the insurance industry because it 
―merely applie[d] ‗laws of general application that have some bearing on 
insurers.‘‖
190
 The Ninth Circuit found this argument unpersuasive as well. 
The Court observed that Morrison‘s practice of disapproving insurance 
forms that contain discretionary clauses is specific to the insurance 
industry.
191
 Moreover, Montana does not require approval of most 
contracts, but instead has ―special solicitude for insurance customers‖ 
because it requires that the Commissioner approve insurance forms in 
particular.
192
 Montana‘s prohibition on discretionary clauses ―addresse[d] 
an insurance-specific problem, because discretionary clauses generally do 
not exist outside of insurance plans.‖
193
 The Ninth Circuit found Morrison‘s 
practice of requiring all insurers to exclude discretionary clauses from their 
policies to be ―an application of a special order‖ as opposed to a general 
rule.
194
 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that Morrison‘s disapproval of 
discretionary clauses is directed toward the insurance industry and satisfies 
the first prong of the Miller test.
195
 
Turning to the second prong of the Miller test, Standard‘s third 
contention was that disapproval of discretionary clauses did not 
substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between insurers and 
insureds.
196
 Standard asserted that risk pooling occurs when an insurance 
contract is made instead of when a claim is made.
197
 Consistent with this 
definition, risk pooling, claim investigations, the appeals process, and 
litigation should fall outside the risk pooling arrangement.
198
 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected Standard‘s argument in favor of a broader notion of risk 
pooling.
199
 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that Morrison‘s practice 
changed the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds 
because insureds ―may no longer agree to a discretionary clause in 
exchange for a more affordable premium.‖
200
 The Court noted that 
Montana‘s policy of barring discretionary clauses and ―removing the 
benefit of a deferential standard of review from insurers‖ would result in 
more claim payouts because insurers would be forced to explain their claim 
decisions.
201
 The Court also found that Morrison‘s practice affected the risk 
pooling arrangement because it altered the terms ―by which the presence or 
absence of the insured contingency [was] determined.‖
202
 The Court finally 
held that Commissioner Morrison‘s practice of disapproving discretionary 
clauses falls under the savings clause and survives ERISA preemption.
203
  
Fourth, Standard also claimed that Morrison‘s practice interfered with 
ERISA‘s exclusive remedial scheme pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
204
 
ERISA preempts ―‗any state-law cause of action that duplicates, 
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supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy.‘‖
205
 The 
Ninth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit in Ross, rejected this argument and held 
that Morrison‘s practice created no additional remedy outside of ERISA‘s 
civil enforcement scheme.
206
 The court acknowledged that this practice 
would likely lead to de novo review in the federal courts, but found no 
conflict with ERISA because de novo had been the default standard of 
review since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Firestone.
207
 The Court thus 
distinguished Morrison‘s disapproval of discretionary clauses from ―cases 
in which a state attempts to meld a new remedy to the ERISA 
framework.‖
208
 
Finally, Standard asserted that Montana‘s bar on discretionary clauses 
contravened the purpose and policy behind ERISA of balancing employees‘ 
right to benefits and incentivizing employers to create benefit plans.
209
 
Standard relied on the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Glenn, where the Court 
retained the Firestone standard of deference instead of requiring de novo 
review, and held that courts must treat a fiduciary‘s conflict of interest as 
just one factor in deciding whether there is abuse of discretion.
210
 The gist 
of Standard‘s argument was that the Ninth Circuit likewise ought to refrain 
from ―adopting a rule that in practice could bring about near universal 
review by judges de novo—i.e. without deference—of a lion‘s share of 
ERISA plan claims denials.‖
211
  
The Ninth Circuit found that the appropriate test was to balance 
ERISA‘s preemption scheme against the state insurance regulation.
212
 The 
Court noted that the Supreme Court‘s refusal to mandate de novo review 
did not necessarily preclude states from issuing insurance regulations that 
had such effect.
213
 Additionally, while the Supreme Court in Firestone and 
Glenn endorsed the abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court‘s 
acceptance of de novo review as the default nonetheless ―indicates that 
highly deferential review is not a cornerstone of the ERISA system.‖
214
 
Recalling the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Rush, where the Court explicitly 
stated that it was permissible for states to eliminate a plan administrator‘s 
discretion and ability to minimize scrutiny of benefit denials, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Commissioner Morrison‘s practice likewise 
prohibited insurers from inserting terms into policies that advantaged the 
insurer.
215
 The Ninth Circuit held that there was no conflict with ERISA 
and expressly declined to limit the reach of the savings clause.
216
 
Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged the tension between Commissioner 
Morrison‘s practice and the federal common law regarding the appropriate 
standard of review in benefits denial cases.
217
  
Finally, the Tenth Circuit recently cited, with approval, the decisions in 
Ross and Morrison.
218
 The court distinguished Ross and Morrison as 
inapplicable to the facts at hand but agreed with their reasoning.
219
  
Verla Hancock participated in an employer-sponsored ERISA-covered 
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plan that offered life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment 
(AD&D) benefits.
220
 The plan paid AD&D benefits for loss of life if (1) the 
participant was injured in an accident covered under the plan, (2) the 
accident was the sole cause of the injury, and (3) death occurred within one 
year of the accident.
221
 However, the plan did not cover injuries resulting 
from physical or mental illness.
222
 MetLife was the plan‘s insurer and claim 
fiduciary, responsible for resolving benefit claims and reviewing appeals.
223
 
The plan granted MetLife discretion to interpret the plan terms and to 
determine eligibility for benefits.
224
 In 2003, Utah‘s insurance 
commissioner issued Rule 590-218, which prohibited discretionary clauses 
in insurance forms relating to an ERISA-covered benefit plan unless ―their 
language is ‗substantially similar‘ to the safe-harbor language set forth in 
the regulation.‖
225
 Additionally, Rule 590-218 completely prohibited 
discretionary clauses in insurance forms that did not relate to an ERISA 
benefit plan.
226
 
After Hancock died, MetLife approved the claim of her daughter Terri 
for life insurance but denied AD&D benefits.
227
 MetLife‘s notification 
letter explained that Hancock was ineligible for AD&D benefits because 
the record failed to establish that Hancock‘s death had been accidental.
228
 
In 2007, Hancock moved for partial summary judgment in district court on 
the standard of review and argued that the court should apply de novo 
review to MetLife‘s denial of AD&D benefits.
229
 Hancock asserted that 
Rule 590-218 deprived MetLife of discretionary authority that would 
justify a deferential standard of review.
230
 MetLife subsequently moved for 
a bench trial and argued that its denial of benefits was ―reasonable and 
supported by substantial evidence.‖
231
  
The district court denied Hancock‘s motion for partial summary 
judgment on the ground that ERISA preempted Rule 590-218 and ruled that 
MetLife was entitled to deferential review.
232
 The district court also denied 
Hancock‘s motion for summary judgment because she failed to show that a 
covered loss had occurred under the plan.
233
 Finally, the district court 
granted MetLife‘s motion and held that MetLife‘s denial of AD&D benefits 
was not arbitrary and capricious.
234
 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether Firestone deference 
was warranted.
235
 With regard to the appropriate standard of review, the 
Tenth Circuit reasoned that this determination rests on whether the 
discretionary clause in the plan complies with Utah‘s insurance Rule 590-
218.
236
 MetLife argued that ERISA preempts the application of Rule 590-
218.
237
 Hancock argued against preemption, but also asserted that even if 
the plan‘s discretionary clause were valid, the court must apply less 
deference because of MetLife‘s conflict of interest and procedural defects 
in MetLife‘s benefit determination.
238
  
The court of appeals noted that Rule 590-218 permits ERISA-governed 
employee benefit plans to include discretionary clauses only if the clause 
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language resembles the safe-harbor language under the rule.
239
 This meant 
that Rule 590-218 could apply to an employee benefit plan only if it 
survived ERISA preemption.
240
 ERISA preempts any state law that relates 
to an employee benefit plan unless the law regulates insurance.
241
 The 
Supreme Court held in Miller that a state law regulates insurance if it is 
specifically directed toward the insurance industry and substantially affects 
the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured.
242
 MetLife did 
not dispute that Rule 590-218 satisfied the first prong of the Miller test.
243
 
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit‘s analysis focused on Miller‘s second prong.
244
 
The Tenth Circuit found that ERISA expressly preempted the 
application of Rule 590-218 to the plan because ―[t]he rule [did] not 
remove the option of insurer discretion from the scope of permissible 
insurance bargains in ERISA plans.‖
245
 Instead, the rule permitted 
discretionary clauses so long as they conformed to particular wording 
requirements.
246
 As such, the rule had no substantial effect on the risk 
pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.
247
 In short, Rule 
590-218 failed to satisfy the second prong of the Miller test.
248
  
The Tenth Circuit suggested that the result might have been different 
had Rule 590-218 prohibited all discretionary clauses.
249
 The Court of 
Appeals pointed to the Ross and Morrison decisions as holding that an 
absolute bar on discretionary clauses substantially affects risk pooling by 
restricting the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and the 
insured.
250
 Hancock, however, involved no such prohibition on the use of 
discretionary clauses and the Tenth Circuit consequently concluded that a 
less than complete bar failed the second part of the Miller test.
251
 
Hancock raised several other arguments regarding the effect of Rule 
590-218 on the risk pooling arrangement. First, she asserted that Rule 590-
218 affects the risk pooling arrangement because a failure to conform 
substantially to the rule‘s safe-harbor language invalidated a discretionary 
clause and deprived the insurer of deferential review by the courts.
252
 The 
Tenth Circuit dismissed Hancock‘s argument as untenable because 
noncompliance with any trivial requirement would trigger de novo review 
and alter the risk pooling arrangement.
253
 The court found that a change in 
the risk pooling arrangement must result from compliance with the state 
law rather than its violation.
254
  
Second, Hancock asserted that Rule 590-218 limited insurer discretion 
because the rule required the language in a discretionary clause to state that 
a federal court would determine the appropriate level of deference to a plan 
administrator‘s decision.
255
 The Tenth Circuit correctly noted that this 
language merely recognized the extent of the federal courts‘ authority, even 
when a plan grants discretionary authority to the administrator,
256
 and 
recognized that the extent of judicial deference depends on the presence of 
conflicts of interest and compliance with procedural requirements instead 
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of merely the inclusion of a discretionary clause in the plan terms.
257
  
The court next considered whether to apply arbitrary and capricious or 
de novo review in light of Hancock‘s assertion that MetLife‘s benefit 
determination process failed to substantially comply with ERISA 
regulations.
258
 Specifically, Hancock argued that MetLife‘s benefit 
determination was procedurally defective because MetLife‘s denial letters 
did not include information required under ERISA and because MetLife did 
not provide a full and fair review of her appeal.
259
 The appellate court 
rejected both contentions.
260
 First, it concluded that MetLife‘s denial letters 
complied with procedural requirements by stating the reasons and relevant 
plan provisions justifying the denial of benefits and by describing the 
information Hancock needed to provide in order to perfect her claim.
261
 In 
addition, the court determined that MetLife had provided Hancock a full 
and fair review of her claim because MetLife did not ignore her evidence, 
but instead merely found it inconclusive.
262
 
Finally, the court of appeals noted that prior to Glenn the presence of a 
conflict had reduced or withheld deference.
263
 Since Glenn rejected burden-
shifting rules and held that conflicts of interest are but one factor that a 
reviewing court must take into account,
264
 the court considered MetLife‘s 
conflict using Firestone deference, saying MetLife‘s benefit denial needed 
only to be sufficiently supported by facts to survive arbitrary and capricious 
review.
265
 The court of appeals concluded that ―MetLife reasonably 
decided that Ms. Hancock failed to prove accidental death.‖
266
 Although 
circumstantial evidence indicated that accidental death was a possibility, 
the autopsy failed to establish any cause of death at all.
267
 MetLife‘s 
reliance on official government conclusions proved that its denial of 
AD&D benefits had not been arbitrary and capricious.
268
 
 
B. THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND  
MEANINGFUL EXTERNAL REVIEW 
  1. Mechanics 
Prior to the PPACA, ERISA had established a process of 
internal/external review available to claimants in instances of benefit claims 
denial. Very simply, this process required a plan participant to pursue an 
internal appeal through the plan‘s administrative review process.
269
 After 
exhausting the internal appeals procedures a claimant could then pursue a 
claim for benefits, typically in federal court.
270
 Firestone, of course, meant 
that this ―external‖ process in federal court was highly deferential to the 
decision making process of the plan administrator.  
As we have seen, some states confronted Firestone deference head-on 
and banned discretionary clauses. In addition, some states enacted their 
own external review processes for claims denied by HMOs and insured 
plans.
271
 In order to understand how external review works under the 
PPACA, it is critical to recognize the important features of the health 
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insurance landscape. First, the PPACA now creates two classes of plans: 
those that are grandfathered and not subject to all PPACA provisions, and 
those that are fully covered by the new statute. Second, health plans are 
either insured or self-insured. Both insured and self-insured plans may be 
grandfathered or not.
272
 Section 1001 of the PPACA
273
 refers to the 
―consumer protections‖ set forth in the Uniform Health Carrier External 
Review Model Act developed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC)
274
 and deems these consumer protections the floor 
below which an external review process cannot fall. Some states have 
adopted the NAIC model act; others have not. Some adopting states have 
followed the model act‘s provisions closely; others have not. This means 
that there is currently a broad range of external review procedures: some 
states have no procedures in place; others have procedures that vaguely 
resemble the model act; still others follow the model act closely; others 
have adopted the model act verbatim.
275
 In response to this varied 
landscape, the PPACA ―encourages‖ states to adopt external review 
procedures that are consistent with NAIC‘s standards.
276
 If a claimant 
resides in a state that has no external review or has procedures that do not 
conform to the NAIC standards, then that claimant is free to use the federal 
external review program.
277
 
The PPACA external review program is certain to be a jolting change 
for self-insured plans that are not grandfathered. Instead of an internal 
process (whose outcome is sometimes affected by the plan‘s own financial 
stake in the outcome), followed by deferential external review,
278
 self-
insured plans now face external review in an explicitly non-deferential 
forum that is less likely than a federal court (which is bound by Firestone) 
to uphold the plan administrator‘s decision. What is less clear is whether 
the NAIC model of external review will somehow manage to identify and 
engage truly disinterested reviewers. The pool of board-certified, licensed 
physicians who are expert in rare diseases and disorders
279
 will surely be 
limited and one would expect insurers and self-insured plans that have a 
significant financial stake in the outcome to come up with creative ways to 
game the external review process. 
2. Who is Grandfathered? 
The PPACA creates a new distinction between plans that were in effect 
on March 23, 2010 and those that become effective subsequently. A 
grandfathered plan is an insured or self-insured plan that existed on or 
before March 23, 2010 and has not taken any steps that cause it to lose 
grandfathered status.
280
 The distinction matters because some provisions of 
the PPACA do not apply to grandfathered plans; specifically, grandfathered 
plans are exempt from the requirements of the statute regarding 
independent, external review.
281
  
Given the importance of grandfathered status, one might expect that 
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plans will pay close attention to plan design changes or failures to act that 
endanger this status. It is worth noting that maintenance of grandfathered 
status comes at an explicit cost of having to observe rules that restrict a 
plan‘s ability to change plan terms and cost-sharing arrangements.
282
 Over 
time, and given the upward trajectory of health insurance costs, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that plans sponsored by small employers will lose 
grandfathered status more rapidly than those sponsored by large employers, 
who may be able to withstand upward cost pressure for longer before 
succumbing to that pressure and amending the plan. Any plan that loses its 
status and is no longer grandfathered will have to comply with the 
PPACA‘s requirements for health plans, including the obligation to provide 
for independent external review. 
 Over time, both small and large employers (small quicker than 
large) will lose grandfathered status and find themselves subject to all of 
the PPACA‘s new requirements. For self-insured plans this will mean a 
much less deferential forum in which to resolve disputes about claims. For 
insured plans, especially those in states that already have an independent 
external review process closely mirroring the NAIC requirements, the 
transition should be far less traumatic. What remains to be seen is whether 
the NAIC-based model will result in fewer outcomes that are broadly 
perceived to be unjust. If it works, this part of Obama Care may mean that 
the federal courts will no longer see a large volume of benefit claims 
litigation. In the meantime, though, the federal courts of appeal will 
continue to operate under Firestone deference—at least to resolve pre-
PPACA cases and those appealed from state or federal external review. 
C. FIRESTONE DEFERENCE AND DISTRUST 
The twin keys to success of the new PPACA external review process 
will be cost and trust. If, at reasonable cost, the process were widely 
perceived by the affected parties to be fair and predictable, one would 
expect to see a significant drop in appeals to the federal courts. This should 
represent a cost savings for both claimants and plans. A perception that the 
process is impartial is important. The biggest risk is that insurers will game 
the process. Imagining that a certain rare and complicated disease has only 
a handful of qualified reviewers, and that each would like to continue to 
perform this work for insurers, it is not hard to conceive that the desire to 
please the insurer and become a repeat player could compromise a 
reviewer‘s work.  
The emerging litigation—all pre-PPACA (there have been only three 
courts of appeals decisions so far)—over discretionary clauses is 
symptomatic of a substantial portion of post-Firestone ERISA common 
law. States struggle to find ways to indirectly confront perceived unfairness 
by plans and their insurers because ERISA‘s expansive preemption 
language expressly prohibits direct measures.
283
 The states resort to devices 
likely to survive preemption analysis under the savings clause, and 
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sometimes this strategy succeeds.
284
 The core problem, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, is: 
[t]he unhelpful drafting of [the preemption language at 29 U.S.C. §1144 
(a) and the Savings Clause at 29 U.S.C. §1144 (b)] occupies a substantial 
share of this Court‘s time. In trying to extrapolate intent in a case like this, 
when Congressional intent seems simultaneously to preempt everything 
and hardly anything, we have no choice but to temper the assumption that 
the ordinary meaning . . . accurately expresses the legislative purpose . . . .
 
 
Neither state strategies nor the litigation they invariably trigger can be 
said to directly encourage any of the oft-stated purposes of the statute: the 
encouragement of efficiency, predictability, and uniformity in the 
administration of employee benefit plans.
285 
Repeatedly, plans and their insurers have suggested that any expansion 
of the states‘ role in regulating ERISA plans would prove destructive to the 
very consumers the states purport to protect.
286
 Two arguments routinely 
offered by insurers—cost and efficient plan administration—are relevant to 
discretionary clauses. The first claim is that any state interference will raise 
premiums that are often paid jointly by plan sponsors and employees.
287
 
Recently, a spokesman for American Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) 
asserted that a ban on discretionary clauses ―will result in an increase in 
costs.‖
288
 However, the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) recently noted 
that a report by Millman, Inc. commissioned by AHIP in 2005 ―does not 
show that insurance costs will face any sort of dramatic increase if 
discretionary clauses are prohibited.‖
289
 
The second common argument against state interference is that it is 
inconsistent with the uniformity Congress hoped would encourage 
employers to voluntarily sponsor benefit plans. The claim is that any action 
that discourages employers from sponsorship is therefore harmful to current 
and future participants. The PPACA, with its NAIC-based standards, 
should address the uniformity concern, at least in the long run. As plans 
lose their grandfathered status and are forced to justify their adverse 
decisions to an independent reviewer, all plans—both insured and self-
insured—should find themselves on a roughly level playing field 
irrespective of the state in which they operate. 
When asked to comment on the role of discretionary clauses in the 
decision to sponsor an ERISA plan, lawyers representing plans noted that 
the clauses provide plan administrators with a fast and inexpensive way to 
deal with benefits claim litigation when it arises.
290
 Banning discretionary 
clauses would have significant unintended consequences for patients and 
employers. Discretionary clauses give patients consistency and uniformity 
in determining the benefits they are eligible for. They also allow employers 
to provide more affordable, reliable health care coverage to the 
employees.
291
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The argument in favor of retaining the Firestone deference model and 
preempting discretionary clause bans is essentially that a ban will prove 
costly to insurers who, in turn, can be expected to pass these costs on to 
employers and participants. Although it lacks significant empirical 
support,
292
 this argument is not a trivial one. As the recent national 
discussion about how to provide health insurance for the approximately 
47,000,000 uninsured
293
 illustrates, cost is an extremely important part of 
the equation. What the argument does not address, however, is the primary 
concern of the states and plaintiffs in benefits claims cases: substantial 
evidence
294
 that the arbitrary and capricious standard emboldens some 
insurers, especially those in Glenn
295
-type conflicts, to deny meritorious 
claims. Hopefully, the PPACA process will go some distance toward 
addressing this issue. Even if it does, some dissatisfied claimants will no 
doubt proceed to federal court. A truly impartial independent review 
process should make it easy to dispose of most of these cases by employing 
Firestone deference. 
For now, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits seem willing to risk premium 
increases and other costs in order to rectify some of the imbalance between 
insurers and participants. The Tenth Circuit has indicated that it agrees with 
the conclusion that complete bans are not preempted by ERISA.
296
 
Although it is conceivable that all the federal circuits will adopt the 
position of Ross
297
 and Morrison,
298
 complete uniformity among the federal 
courts of appeal in ERISA matters is not common.
299
 Should a conflict 
arise, or even in the odd absence of a conflict, it is hard to believe that the 
Supreme Court would allow more than twenty years of Firestone deference 
to disappear easily. 
In Conkright v. Frommert
300
 the majority gave no hint that it was 
concerned with the affects of the now commonplace arbitrary and 
capricious standard on participants‘ ability to obtain contractually promised 
benefits. On the contrary, Justice Roberts explained: 
Congress sought ―to create a system that is [not] so complex that 
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers 
from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.‖ ERISA induc[es] 
employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities, 
under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of 
ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred. 
Firestone deference protects those interests and, by permitting an 
employer to grant primary interpretive authority over an ERISA plan to 
the plan administrator, preserves the ―careful balancing‖ on which ERISA 
is based. Deference promotes efficiency by encouraging resolution of 
benefits disputes through internal administrative proceedings, rather than 
costly litigation. It also promotes predictability, as an employer can rely 
on the expertise of the plan administrator rather than worry about 
unexpected and inaccurate plan interpretations that might result from de 
novo judicial review. Moreover, Firestone deference serves the interest of 
uniformity, helping to avoid a patchwork of different interpretations of a 
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plan, like the one here, that covers employees in different jurisdictions—a 
result that ―would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program 
operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce 
benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.‖
301
 
The open empirical question is how a ban on discretionary clauses 
would affect an employer‘s decision of whether to sponsor a plan. What is 
certain, though, is that some insurers take advantage of the deference they 
enjoy under the arbitrary and capricious standard and deny claims that 
might well have been paid following de novo review. 
The central dilemma in discretionary clause cases is what to do about 
the atmosphere of profound distrust in which all parties must operate. 
Insurers worry (sometimes with justification)
302
 that they are bombarded by 
fraudulent claims brought by ignorant or unscrupulous plan participants. 
Deferential review reduces insurer anxiety, of course, and insulates the 
judgment of the plan administrator under most circumstances. Deferential 
review is also clearly the preferred standard for a financially conflicted 
insurer like MetLife in Glenn.
303
  
Claimants worry (sometimes with justification) that financial 
considerations—and not contract of adhesion-based promises—dominate 
the evaluation of their claim. Instead of an impartial review, claimants and 
their advocates anticipate a profit-conscious process like the one described 
by Professor Langbein.
304
 Understandably, they are typically anxious to 
receive the benefits for which they contracted, especially in cases involving 
disability, severe illness and loss of employment. 
The only way forward that respects the financial concerns of insurers 
and the legitimate expectations of participants in an atmosphere pervaded 
by distrust is the creation of a truly impartial third party who can be 
counted on to review claims without conflict. Some will remember that a 
few years ago Senator John McCain and others
305
 proposed allowing a 
claimant to appeal to an independent, non-insurer affiliated board for de 
novo review. The PPACA is arguably the result of that effort, although 
perhaps not exactly what the Senator had in mind. At the time, some of the 
details elicited criticism,
306
 but the basic intuition was sound. The new 
interim regulations create a more complicated system in which the quality 
of external review will depend largely upon the ability of a plan sponsor to 
hold onto grandfathered status. Years of Firestone deference have 
demonstrated that what insurers and claimants need is an impartial, 
independent, inexpensive, and efficient process that refuses to focus on the 
financial concerns of often conflicted insurers to the exclusion of explicit 
promises made to the claimant. Ordinarily, de novo review in federal court 
would meet all of these requirements, except perhaps efficiency and low 
cost. A model akin to an arbitration panel,
307
 with complete independence 
from industry associations, would come closer to the ideal. Irrespective of 
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the details, the goal should be a regime in which insurers know what their 
costs will be because they routinely pay all legitimate claims in full and in a 
manner consistent with promises made via employer-sponsored contracts of 
adhesion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The formal state of the law on discretionary clauses in ERISA-governed 
employee benefit plans has undergone little shift in the last two decades. In 
Firestone, the Supreme Court held that federal courts must apply de novo 
review to an adverse benefit determination, unless the plan grants the 
administrator discretionary authority to interpret plan terms and make 
benefit decisions. The existence of a discretionary clause in a plan triggers 
a deferential standard of review unless the court finds a clear abuse of 
discretion by the administrator. Firestone has triggered criticism because of 
a perception that discretionary clauses weaken ERISA‘s goal of protecting 
the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. However, as the fairly 
recent decisions in Glenn and Conkright demonstrate, the Supreme Court 
remains attached to Firestone deference. 
In the last few years, states have undertaken efforts to limit 
discretionary clauses. Today, approximately twelve states prohibit 
discretionary clauses in insurance policies and several others limit the use 
of such clauses.
308
 The insurance industry has begun to challenge these 
state efforts to ban discretionary clauses on ERISA preemption grounds. A 
handful of courts of appeals have reached a consensus that state rules 
barring discretionary clauses survive ERISA preemption because they 
regulate insurance and consequently fall under ERISA‘s savings clause. 
Only the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have thus far considered cases 
challenging state bans on discretionary clauses. Notably, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in Standard Insurance Co. v. Morrison, the Ninth 
Circuit case that uphold Montana‘s ban on discretionary clauses. One likely 
reason for the denial of certiorari is the lack of a circuit split on the issue of 
whether ERISA preempts laws that prohibit discretionary clauses.
309
 It may 
well be that the importance of discretionary clauses will decline if the hard 
cases are resolved by an external reviewer. If external review never gains 
the confidence of plans and participants, though, the bans on discretionary 
clauses could continue to be an important part of the calculus in benefits 
claim cases. 
State efforts to proscribe discretionary clauses undeniably provide more 
protection to plan participants and beneficiaries because administrators can 
no longer expect courts to defer to their benefit decisions. As the Sixth 
Circuit explained in Ross, the effect of state rules barring discretionary 
clauses may be to mandate de novo review by the courts.
310
 On the other 
hand, it remains unclear how employers will react to an increase in 
regulatory pressure from the states. Chief Justice Roberts argued in Glenn 
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that judicial deference to a fiduciary‘s discretionary authority ―encourages 
employers to provide medical and retirement benefits to their employees 
through ERISA-governed plans—something they are not required to do.‖
311
 
Therefore, while plan participants and beneficiaries may be better off in the 
short term as a result of limits on discretionary clauses, the long-term effect 
on plan creation is more difficult to ascertain. The latest rulings coming out 
of the circuit courts of appeals have generally dismissed such concerns in 
favor of protecting individual interests in employee benefits. Ideally, the 
creation of an efficient and impartial forum for review of benefit claims 
denials, like that called for in the PPACA, would reassure claimants that 
legitimate claims were indeed being paid, while saving cost-conscious 
employers and insurers from lengthy and expensive federal litigation. The 
Supreme Court‘s attachment to Firestone deference seems certain to collide 
with the decisions in Ross and Morrison. Nonetheless, states will 
presumably look to the adoption of outright bans in order to rectify the 
unfairness that Firestone deference could continue to create for plan 
participants and beneficiaries. 
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preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006). However, § 514(b)(2)(B), known as the 
deemer clause, provides that no employee benefit plan shall be deemed to be an insurance 
company within the meaning of the savings clause for the purpose of avoiding ERISA 
preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006). See Hancock v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590 
F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2009) (―The question is whether the [discretionary] clause is 
valid. Ms. Hancock contends that it is invalid because it fails to comply with Utah‘s 
insurance Rule 590-218; therefore, she reasons, MetLife lacks discretionary authority and 
its decision must be reviewed de novo. MetLife counters, however, that ERISA expressly 
preempts the application of the rule in this case.‖); Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 
837, 841 (9th Cir. 2009) (―Standard Insurance Company (‗Standard‘) duly applied to 
[Montana‘s insurance commissioner] Morrison for approval of its proposed disability 
insurance forms which contained discretionary clauses; Morrison denied the request. 
Standard responded by suing in district court, arguing that the subject is preempted by 
ERISA. The district court granted the Commissioner summary judgment, and Standard 
timely appeals.‖); Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 603 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(―Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment, with the Insurance 
Industry arguing, inter alia, that (1) the rules are preempted by ERISA because they 
 
       2010]      POST-FIRESTONE SKIRMISHES                                  27 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
interfere with that statute‘s objectives, and (2) the rules do not fall within the ambit of 
ERISA‘s savings clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The district court rejected each of 
these arguments, granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. We review 
the district court‘s grant of summary judgment on the issue of ERISA preemption de 
novo.‖).  
10 For examples of other attempts by the states to regulate around ERISA, see Aetna 
Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempted a Texas state 
law which allowed claimants to recover damages when an HMO failed to exercise 
ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 
141, 150 (2001) (holding that ERISA preempted a Washington state law that revoked the 
designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset upon the dissolution of 
marriage because the law directly conflicted with ERISA‘s requirement that plans be 
administered and benefits be paid in accordance with plan documents); De Buono v. 
NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997) (holding that ERISA 
did not preempt a New York state law that imposed a tax on medical centers operated by 
ERISA plans because the law merely burdened the plans‘ administration and therefore did 
not ―relate to‖ them within the meaning of ERISA); Cal. Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement 
v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (holding that ERISA did not 
preempt a California state law that required contractors on public projects to pay all of 
their workers the prevailing wage except those workers participating in a state-approved 
apprenticeship program because the law merely altered the incentives without dictating the 
choices facing ERISA plans); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (holding that ERISA did not preempt a New 
York state law that imposed surcharges on hospital bills that were paid by commercial 
insurance or HMO coverage purchased through an ERISA plan because the law produced 
only indirect economic effects on ERISA plans and therefore did not ―relate to‖ them 
within the meaning of ERISA); Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 
125, 126 (1992) (holding that ERISA preempted a section of a D.C. law which required an 
employer who provides health coverage to an employee to provide the same level of health 
coverage to an injured employee who is eligible for worker‘s compensation benefits); 
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64–65 (1990) (holding that ERISA preempted a 
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Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 108 (1983) (holding that ERISA preempted New York‘s 
Human Rights Law to the extent that the law prohibited employment practices that were 
then lawful under federal law, such as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in 
employee benefit plans); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 526 (1981) 
(holding that ERISA preempted a New Jersey state law which prohibited offsets of 
pension benefits by the amount of workers‘ compensation awards); Hancock v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1141, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that ERISA preempted a 
Utah state rule which governed discretionary clauses in ERISA-governed employee benefit 
plans); Golden Gate Rest. Ass‘n v. City & County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 661 
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that ERISA did not preempt the San Francisco Health Care 
Security Ordinance that imposed healthcare spending requirements on employers because 
those requirements did not ―establish‖ an ERISA plan or have an impermissible 
connection with or reference to such plans); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass‘n v. Fielder, 475 
F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA preempted Maryland‘s Fair Share 
Health Care Fund Act which required employers with 10,000 or more employees to spend 
at least 8% of their payroll on employees‘ health insurance or pay the amount of their 
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Minn. Dep‘t of Pub. Safety, 267 F.3d 807, 819–20 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that ERISA 
preempted parts of the Minnesota Sprinkler Fitter Licensing Law and rules that mandated 
the standards for an approved apprenticeship program but offered no choice of compliance 
with either state and federal standards); Am. Med. Sec. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 360 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA preempted a Maryland insurance regulation which 
required self-funded ERISA plans to provide state-mandated health benefits when they 
purchase certain types of stop-loss insurance); Plumbing Indus. Bd. v. E.W. Howell Co., 
126 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA preempted a New York lien law 
which required a general contractor to assume responsibility for a sub-contractor-
employer‘s failure to cover his benefit obligations and thus impermissibly added to the 
exclusive list of parties responsible for an employer‘s benefit obligations under ERISA); 
Air Transp. Ass‘n of Am. V. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1155 
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that ERISA preempted a San Francisco city ordinance which 
prohibited the city from contracting with companies whose employee benefit plans 
discriminated between employees with spouses and employees with domestic partners); 
Fixx v. United Mine Workers, 645 F. Supp. 352, 355 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (holding that 
ERISA preempted a section of a West Virginia law that prohibited employers who 
provided any type of medical insurance from reducing or canceling such benefits while an 
employee was on temporary total disability). 
11 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–48, 124 Stat. 119. 
12 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–52, 124 Stat. 
1024. 
13 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,331 (July 23, 2010). 
14 Id. at 43,330; Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers 
Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (July 19, 2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act; Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and 
Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,188 (June 28, 2010); Interim Final Rules for Group 
Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health 
Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538 (June 17, 
2010); Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating 
to Dependent Coverage of Children to Age 26 Under the Patient Protection Affordable 
Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,122 (May 13, 2010). 
15Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to 
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,539 (June 17, 2010). 
16 Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, § 1251; as of this writing, the 
government has also exempted some non-grandfathered from certain provisions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Certain health insurance plans and 
issuers can now obtain waivers from the minimum annual limit requirements under the 
PPACA through the Health and Human Services Office of Consumer Information and 
Insurance Oversight. OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, OCIIO SUB-
REGULATORY GUIDANCE (OCIIO 2010–1): PROCESS FOR OBTAINING WAIVERS OF THE 
ANNUAL LIMITS REQUIREMENTS OF PHS ACT SECTION 2711 (2010). The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services‘ waiver authority was provided for in the interim final rules 
relating to annual limits. Requirements for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Issuers Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Relating to Preexisting 
Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 
75 Fed. Reg. 37,188, 37,230 (June 28, 2010).  
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 The interim final rules state: ―[d](3) Waiver authority of the Secretary. For plan years 
(or in the individual market, policy years) beginning before January 1, 2014, the Secretary 
may establish a program under which the requirements of paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
relating to annual limits may be waived (for such period as is specified by the Secretary) 
for a group health plan or health insurance coverage that has an annual dollar limit on 
benefits below the restricted annual limits provided under paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
if compliance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section would result in a significant decrease in 
access to benefits under the plan or health insurance coverage or would significantly 
increase premiums for the plan or health insurance coverage.‖ Id. 
 Section (d)(1) in the interim final rules allows group health plans or health insurance 
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage, with respect to plan years 
beginning after September 23, 2010 and before January 1, 2014, to establish for any 
individual an annual limit on the dollar amount of benefits, which are ―essential health 
benefits‖ under section 1302(b) of the PPACA and applicable regulations, as long as the 
limit does not fall below the amounts specified in the interim final rules. Id. Therefore, the 
Secretary‘s waiver authority constitutes an exception to Section (d)(1). For plan or policy 
years beginning on or after January 1, 2014, however, no annual limits will be permitted 
except in grandfathered plans. Id. at 37, 191. 
The interim final rules also provided that ―Guidance from the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services regarding the scope and process for applying for a waiver is expected to 
be issued in the near future.‖ Id. On September 3, 2010, the Health and Human Services 
Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight issued a Bulletin which clarified 
that the waiver process was contemplated largely within the context of ―limited benefit‖ or 
―mini-med‖ plans that have annual limits well below the restricted annual limits set out in 
the regulations and would have trouble complying with the requirements of Section (d)(1). 
Regardless of the PPACA and the regulations, the low annual limits for these plans would 
stay in place pursuant to a waiver. Since waivers are issued on a one-year basis, group 
health plans and health insurance issuers have to reapply for a waiver for each subsequent 
plan or policy year prior to January 1, 2014, when the waiver practice is set to expire. 
OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, OCIIO SUB-REGULATORY GUIDANCE 
(OCIIO 2010–1): PROCESS FOR OBTAINING WAIVERS OF THE ANNUAL LIMITS 
REQUIREMENTS OF PHS ACT SECTION 2711 (2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/ 
patient/ociio_2010-1_20100903_508.pdf.  
The New York Times reported in October 2010 that the Obama administration had 
granted at least 30 waivers. Reed Abelson, Waivers Aim at Talk of Dropping Health 
Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at B1. The most recent statistic from the Department 
of Health and Human Services states that 222 waivers have been granted as of December 
3, 2010. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Approved Applications for 
Waiver of the Annual Limits Requirements of the PHS Act Section 2711 as of December 
3, 2010, http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html. 
The HHS Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight issued another 
clarification of the waiver process in a Bulletin on November 5, 2010. First, group health 
plans and health insurance issuers who obtain a waiver will have to notify their 
participants that their plan or policy does not meet the restricted annual limits for essential 
benefits which are set out in the Interim Final Rules (IFR), and that the plan or issuer has 
received a waiver of that requirement. Second, in order for issuers to be able to comply 
with state laws that require, issuers to offer policies with annual limits that are below the 
minimum requirements established in the Interim Final Rules, a state can now apply for a 
waiver of the restricted annual limits ―on behalf of issuers of state-mandated policies in the 
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state if state law required the policies to be offered by the issuers prior to September 23, 
2010. Although the state may apply on the issuers‘ behalf, the application must still satisfy 
the standard established in the IFR that compliance by the issuers would result in a 
‗significant decrease in access to benefits‘ or a ‗significant increase in premiums.‘‖ Any 
state waiver applications will be effective retroactively to September 23, 2010. OFFICE OF 
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, OCIIO SUB-REGULATORY GUIDANCE (OCIIO 
2010—1A) SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE (2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/11-
05-2010annual_limits_waiver_bulletin.pdf.   
Finally, certain plans that were granted waivers of the annual limits requirements have 
also requested an exemption from the PPACA‘s medical loss ratio (―MLR‖) provisions. 
These provisions, which are found in Section 2718 to the Public Health Service Act 
(PHSA), require issuers of group and individual coverage to submit annual reports to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services about the percentage of premiums that the issuer 
spends on reimbursement for clinical services or improving health care, if the amount of 
spending doesn‘t meet the minimal standards for a particular plan year. The MLR 
requirement will go into effect on January 1, 2011. Mini-med plans have expressed 
concern about meeting this requirement and the Secretary is expected to issue regulations 
implementing the MLR provisions and taking into account the special circumstances of 
mini-med plans. Id. 
17 Grandfathered health plan coverage applies to coverage provided by group health plans 
or health insurance issuers in which an individual was enrolled as of the PPACA‘s 
enactment on March 23, 2010. The regulations provide that a plan cannot lose 
grandfathered status as long as it has covered someone continuously since March 23, 2010, 
even if all the other individuals who were enrolled in the plan on that date cease to be 
covered. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage 
Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,562 (June 17, 2010).  
 The regulations prescribe detailed rules on how to maintain grandfathered status. 
Health plans are required to disclose their grandfathered status to plan participants and 
beneficiaries in a written statement or risk losing such status. Additionally, health plans 
must retain records which state the plan terms and any other documents that are necessary 
to verify their status as grandfathered plans. Failure to comply with the recordkeeping 
requirements outlined in the interim final regulations causes plans to lose their 
grandfathered status. Next, a plan ceases to be a grandfathered health plan if the purpose of 
a merger or acquisition is to cover new individuals under the plan. Furthermore, a plan 
loses its grandfathered status if employees are transferred into the plan or health insurance 
from a plan that they were covered under on March 23, 2010; if the transferee plan were 
treated as an amendment of the transferor plan; and if there was no ―bona fide 
employment-based reason‖ to transfer the employees into the transferee plan. Id. at 34, 
562–65. 
 Collectively bargained plans are also subject to the requirements outlined in the 
interim final regulations regarding the maintenance of grandfather status. Such plans 
remain grandfathered at least until the date when the last collective bargaining agreement, 
which was in effect on March 23, 2010, terminates. Moreover, group plans or health 
insurance coverage cease to be grandfathered if they eliminate all or substantially all 
benefits which are required to diagnose or treat a condition; if there is an increase in 
percentage cost-sharing requirements, such as coinsurance; if there is an increase in fixed-
amount cost-sharing requirements other than a co-payment, such as a deductible, which 
exceeds the maximum percentage increases as defined in the regulations; and finally, if 
there is an increase in the fixed-amount co-payment which is equal to $5 increased by 
medical inflation or exceeds the maximum percentage increase. A grandfathered plan also 
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loses its status if the employer or employee organization decreases its contribution rate by 
more than 5 percentage points below the contribution rate for the period that covered 
March 23, 2010, whether the reduction is based on cost of coverage or a formula employed 
by the plan. Id. 
Recently, an amendment to the regulations concerning grandfathered group health 
plans and health insurance issuers has introduced the following changes. A group health 
plan or any health insurance coverage offered in connection with the group health plan 
does not cease to have grandfathered status if the plan or its sponsor enters into a new 
policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 that is effective on or after 
November 15, 2010, provided that the plan remains in compliance with the other 
requirements for grandfathered plans. Amendment to the Interim Final Rules for Group 
Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health 
Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,114, 70,116 
(Nov. 17, 2010). However, the amendment does not apply retroactively and if a group 
health plan or its sponsor enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after 
March 23, 2010 that is effective before November 15, 2010, the plan loses its 
grandfathered status. Id. at 70,121. Additionally, a group health plan that changes its 
insurance coverage must provide to the new health insurance issuer documentation of plan 
terms under its prior health coverage sufficient to determine whether a change causing a 
loss of grandfathered status has occurred. Id. In contrast to group health plans, when health 
insurance coverage is provided in the individual market, a change in issuers would be 
considered a change in the health insurance coverage in which the individual was enrolled 
on March 23, 2010, and the new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance would not be a 
grandfathered health plan. Id. at 70,116.  
18 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,354–58 (July 23, 2010). 
19 See, e.g., the detailed description of the pre-litigation record in Holmstrom v. Met. Life 
Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16123, at *3–17 (7th Cir. 2010). 
20 See discussion of Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, infra at Section II.B. 
21 A State external review can take place following either an initial or final benefit denial 
pursuant to internal claims and appeals procedures. In the event that the State external 
review process requires exhaustion of internal procedures, such a requirement must not 
apply if the plan or issuer has waived it; if the plan or issuer is deemed to have exhausted 
the internal claims and appeals procedures under applicable law (such as by failing to 
comply with the standards for internal review outlined in the regulations); or if the 
claimant has applied for expedited external review at the same as applying for an 
expedited internal appeal. Additionally, the State external review must be based on the 
plan or issuer‘s requirements for ―medical necessity, appropriateness, health care setting, 
level of care, or effectiveness of a covered benefit.‖ Interim Final Rules for Group Health 
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External 
Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
43,356 (July 23, 2010). 
22 Id. at 43,357. 
23 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
24 Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359–61 (2002) (―Section 4-10 of 
Illinois‘s Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 125, § 4-10 
(2000), provides recipients of health coverage by such organizations with a right to 
independent medical review of certain denials of benefits. . . . [The Illinois HMO Act 
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provides that] ‗[e]ach Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the 
timely review by a physician holding the same class of license as the primary care 
physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance Organization, jointly selected 
by the patient . . . primary care physician and the Health Maintenance Organization in the 
event of a dispute between the primary care physician and the Health Maintenance 
Organization regarding the medical necessity of a covered service proposed by a primary 
care physician. In the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to 
be medically necessary, the Health Maintenance Organization shall provide the covered 
service.‘‖). 
25 See supra note 23; see also Rush, 536 U.S. 355.  
26 KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 127 (2005) (―A showing of a 
conflict in decisions of the courts of appeals . . . is likely to weigh strongly with the Court 
as a factor favoring review . . . .‖); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1567, 1569 (2008) (stating that the Justices‘ concern with ensuring uniformity and 
resolving circuit splits drive the case selection process at the U.S. Supreme Court and 
account for seventy percent of the Court‘s docket). 
27 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,354–58 (July 23, 2010). 
28 See Langbein, supra note 7. 
29 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
30 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006). 
31 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
32 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)). 
33 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
34 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
35 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002). 
36 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006). 
37 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990). 
38 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (2006). 
39 See D. Andrew Portinga, OFIS Bans Discretionary Clauses in Insurance Policies, 1 J. 
INS. & INDEM. L. 1, 11 (2008); Henry Quillen, State Prohibition of Discretionary Clauses 
in ERISA-Covered Benefit Plans, 32 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 67, 69 (2006). 
40 John Langbein, supra note 7, at 1316. 
41 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989). 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 115. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Langbein, supra note 7, at 1326. 
49 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. 
50 Langbein, supra note 7, at 1324; Beverly Cohen, Divided Loyalties: How the Metlife v. 
Glenn Standard Discounts ERISA Fiduciaries‘ Conflict of Interest, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 
955, 960 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Firestone allowed plan 
fiduciaries to determine claims ―in a way that better controlled the costs of their employee 
benefit plans, as they could construe plan terms to promote cost efficiency and would be 
subject to reversal by a court only if their interpretations were arbitrary and capricious‖); 
John Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 222 (1990) 
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(criticizing Firestone on the grounds that, ―If the purpose of ERISA fiduciary law is to 
protect plan participants from abusive management by the plan fiduciary, it seems 
transparently counterproductive to allow the employer to bootstrap around the safe-guards 
of the statute by inserting boilerplates in the plans ordering the courts not to pay much 
attention to the misbehavior of an employer-dominated fiduciary.‖).  
51 Mark DeBofsky, Discretionary Clauses and Insurance, 25 J. INS. REG. 15, 15 (2006). 
52 Id. (quoting Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
53 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 363 (2002). 
54 Id. at 359 
55 Id. at 360. 
56 Id. at 359–60. 
57 Id. at 359 
58 Id. at 361. 
59 Id. 
60
 Id. at 360. 
61 Id. at 362–63. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 363. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 387. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 385, n. 16. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 386–87. 
70 Id. at 15. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 385. 
73 Id. at 386. 
74 The Supreme Court‘s failure to clarify the extent of judicial deference in cases where a 
plan administrator is conflicted and also enjoys Firestone deference resulted in a variety of 
approaches to this issue in the Courts of Appeals. See Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 
154 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying a sliding scale approach whereby the existence of a conflict 
of interest mandates a heightened form of arbitrary and capricious review); Rud v. Liberty 
Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 438 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no conflict of interest 
despite the insurer‘s role as plan administrator and payor of benefits, and applying the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review). 
75 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108–09 (2008). 
76 Id. at 109. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 109. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85
 Id. 
86 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31a, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) 
(No. 06-923) (―MetLife then reevaluated plaintiff‘s claim and concluded that benefits were 
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not payable after September 16, 2002. Plaintiff was advised of this decision in a four-page 
letter dated August 28, 2002. AR 66–69. In this letter, MetLife noted that Dr. Patel 
previously found that plaintiff was able to work; that plaintiff‘s medical records supported 
the conclusion that plaintiff‘s condition was stable and plaintiff was able to perform 
fulltime sedentary work.‖).  
87Metro., 554 U.S. at 109.  
88 Id. 
89 Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2006), aff‘d 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (―In this 
case, the district court appropriately reviewed the record under the ―arbitrary and 
capricious‖ standard, because the plan at issue granted the plan administrator discretionary 
authority to interpret the terms of the plan and to determine benefits. . . . Indeed, the 
plaintiff conceded that review for arbitrariness was the correct standard of review here‖). 
90Metro., 554 U.S. at 110.  
91 Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d at 674 (―[W]e conclude that MetLife‘s decision to deny 
long-term benefits in this case was not the product of a principled and deliberative 
reasoning process. MetLife acted under a conflict of interest and also in unacknowledged 
conflict with the determination of disability by the Social Security Administration. In 
denying benefits, it offered no explanation for crediting a brief form filled out by Dr. Patel 
while overlooking his detailed reports. This inappropriately selective consideration of 
Glenn‘s medical record was compounded by the fact that the occupational skills analyst 
and the independent medical consultant were apparently not provided with full information 
from Dr. Patel on which to base their conclusions. Moreover, there was no adequate basis 
for the plan administrator‘s decision not to factor in one of the major consideration in 
Glenn‘s pathology, that of the role that stress played in aggravating her condition and, in 
the language of the MetLife policy, in preventing her return to ‗gainful work or service for 
which [she is] reasonably qualified taking into consideration [her] training, education, 
experience, and past earning.‘ Taken together, these factors reflect a decision by MetLife 
that can only be described as arbitrary and capricious.‖). 
92 Metro., 554 U.S. at 110. 
93 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (No. 06-923) (―If an administrator that both 
determines and pays claims under an ERISA plan is deemed to be operating under a 
conflict of interest, how should that conflict be taken into account on judicial review of a 
discretionary benefit determination.‖). 
94Metro., 554 U.S. at 110. 
95 Id. at 111. 
96 Id. at 112. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (―[W]here it is the employer that both funds the plan and evaluates the claims . . . 
[t]he employer‘s fiduciary interest may counsel in favor of granting a borderline claim 
while its immediate financial interest counsels to the contrary. Thus, the employer has an 
‗interest . . . conflicting with that of the beneficiaries,‘ the type of conflict that judges must 
take into account when they review the discretionary acts of a trustee of a common-law 
trust.‖). 
100 Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) 
(No. 06-923) (―The dual-role conflict that everybody knows exists . . . was absolutely 
intended on‖); Brief for Petitioners at 23, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 
(2008) (No. 06-923) (―Under traditional trust-law principles, trustees may serve in settings 
where their decisions could potentially further their own interests, as long as that 
arrangement is contemplated in the trust documents.‖). 
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101Metro., 554 U.S. at 112.  
102 Id. at 113. 
103 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) 
(No. 06-923) (―ERISA‘s text, structure, and purpose establish that entities that both 
evaluate and pay benefit claims do not, without more, operate under a conflict of interest 
that must be weighed on judicial review. In an effort to circumvent the clear implications 
of these interpretive guideposts, respondent and the United States marginalize ERISA‘s 
statutory text, invoke irrelevant trust-law principles that post-date ERISA‘s enactment, and 
adopt a restrictive view of ERISA‘s statutory objectives.‖). 
104 Brief for Petitioners at 28–29, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (No. 
06-923) (―ERISA reflects Congress‘s ‗desire not to create a system that is so complex that 
. . . litigation expenses[] unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit 
plans.‘ . . . Indeed, ERISA seeks to facilitate cost-effective dispute resolution through 
internal administrative review rather than litigation. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2); 29 C.F.R. § 
2560.503-1(h)(1). Increasing the litigation burdens on ERISA plans will drain their limited 
financial resources and discourage employers from establishing benefit plans-to the 
substantial detriment of existing and prospective plan participants and beneficiaries. This 
Court should not lightly rewrite the deferential standard that the plan settlor envisioned 
when it delegated discretionary authority to the claim fiduciary, solely on the basis of a 
potential conflict that was also contemplated by the plan, and thus invite wasteful litigation 
that can only diminish the assets that are ultimately available to provide and fund 
benefits.‖). 
105Metro., 554 U.S. at 113 (―MetLife adds that to find a conflict here is inconsistent . . . 
with an ERISA provision specifically allowing employers to administer their own plans, 
see 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3).‖). 
106 Id. at 114. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 114–15. 
109 Id. at 114 (The Supreme Court noted that ―the employer‘s own conflict may extend to 
its selection of an insurance company to administer its plan. An employer choosing an 
administrator in effect buys insurance for others and consequently (when compared to the 
marketplace customer who buys for himself) may be more interested in an insurance 
company with low rates than in one with accurate claims processing.‖ The Court correctly 
observed that a conflict of interest may be no less obvious in the case of an employer who 
uses a third-party administrator than in the case of a self-insuring employer). 
110 Metro., 554 U.S. at 115. 
111 Id. (The Supreme Court elaborated that a legal rule which requires courts to consider a 
conflict of interest as a factor in their analysis of a benefit denial also permits them to take 
account of the full range of facts and circumstances that diminish ―the significance or 
severity of the conflict in individual cases.‖). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Metro., 554 U.S. at 115. 
115 Id. (―[W]e elucidate what this Court set forth in Firestone, namely, that a conflict 
should ‗be weighed as a ‗factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.‘‖). 
116 Id. 
117
 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 116.  
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120 Metro., 554 U.S. at 116 (―Had Congress intended such a system of review, we believe it 
would not have left to the courts the development of review standards but would have said 
more on the subject.‖). The PPACA is now, arguably, the expression of explicit 
Congressional intent or guidance the Court has been waiting for. 
121 Id.; The Supreme Court‘s decision in Glenn effectively overturned the Third Circuit‘s 
sliding scale approach requiring courts to apply a heightened arbitrary and capricious 
standard when plan administrators operate under a conflict of interest. See Goletz v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11501, at *8 (3d Cir. June 7, 2010) 
(―We had previously applied a heightened form of arbitrary and capricious review for 
those cases in which an administrator acts under a conflict of interest, using a ―sliding 
scale‖ approach to address how much deference should properly be afforded to a 
conflicted administrator‘s determination. See Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 161 
(3d Cir. 2007). However, in the wake of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 554 
U.S. 105 (2008) (―Met Life‖), our sliding scale approach is no longer tenable.‖). 
122
 Metro., 554 U.S. at 116.  
123 Id. at 117 (―We believe that Firestone means what the word ‗factor‘ implies, namely, 
that when judges review the lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often take account of 
several different considerations of which a conflict of interest is one. . . . In such instances, 
any one factor will act as a tie-breaker when the other factors are closely balanced, the 
degree of closeness necessary depending upon the tiebreaking factor‘s inherent or case-
specific importance. The conflict of interest at issue here, for example, should prove more 
important (perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood 
that it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited to, cases where an 
insurance company administrator has a history of biased claims administration.‖). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 119 (The Supreme Court‘s opinion was accompanied by concurrences from Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy and a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia with 
whom Justice Thomas joined). 
126 Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 176 L. Ed. 2d 469 (2010). 
127 Id. at 1645. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1647. 
131
 Id. at 1645. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 Id.; Frommert v. Conkright, 433 F.3d 254, 265–66 (2d Cir. 2006), rev‘d, 130 S. Ct. 
1640 (2010) (―Since the terms of the phantom account were neither included in the 1989 
Restatement nor included in the Plan‘s SPDs up through 1994, we disagree that the Plan 
has always contained the phantom account or that its existence was adequately disclosed. 
It is clear, under either an arbitrary or capricious standard or as a matter of law, that the 
Plan administrator‘s conclusion that the Plan always included the phantom account is 
unreasonable.‖). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id.  
138
 Frommert v. Conkright, 472 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456–58 (W.D. N.Y. 2007).  
139 Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 at 1645. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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142 Id. at 1651–52 (―The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the District Court could 
refuse to defer to the Plan Administrator‘s interpretation of the Plan on remand, simply 
because the Court of Appeals had found a previous related interpretation by the 
Administrator to be invalid. Because we reverse on that ground, we do not reach the 
question whether the Court of Appeals also erred in applying a deferential standard of 
review to the decision of the District Court on the merits.‖). The Supreme Court never 
reached the second question on which it granted certiorari—whether the court of appeals 
properly deferred to the district court—because it determined that the district court 
erroneously refused to defer to the plan administrator‘s interpretation of the plan on 
remand. The Supreme Court‘s answer to the first question on which it granted certiorari 
precluded answering the second one.  
143 Id. at 1646. 
144 Id. (―It is undisputed that, under Firestone and the terms of the Plan, the Plan 
Administrator here would normally be entitled to deference when interpreting the Plan. 
See 328 F. Supp. 2d, at 430–31 (observing that the Plan grants the Plan Administrator 
‗broad discretion in making decisions relative to the Plan‘). The Court of Appeals, 
however, crafted an exception to Firestone deference. Specifically, the Second Circuit held 
that a court need not apply a deferential standard ‗where the administrator ha[s] previously 
construed the same [plan] terms and we found such a construction to have violated 
ERISA.‘ 535 F.3d at 119. Under that view, the District Court here was entitled to reject a 
reasonable interpretation of the Plan offered by the Plan Administrator, solely because the 
Court of Appeals had overturned a previous interpretation by the Administrator. . . . We 
reject this ‗one-strike-and-you‘re-out‘ approach. Brief for Petitioners 51. As an initial 
matter, it has no basis in the Court‘s holding in Firestone . . .‖). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1646–47 (―[Firestone] set out a broad standard of deference without any 
suggestion that the standard was susceptible to ad hoc exceptions like the one adopted by 
the Court of Appeals. . . . Indeed, we refused to create such an exception 
to Firestone deference in Glenn, recognizing that ERISA law was already complicated 
enough without adding ―special procedural or evidentiary rules‖ to the mix. . . . If, as we 
held in Glenn, a systemic conflict of interest does not strip a plan administrator of 
deference, . . . it is difficult to see why a single honest mistake would require a different 
result.‖); The Supreme Court‘s conclusion was a response to the court of appeals‘ 
reasoning in Frommert v. Conkright. The court of appeals stated, ―Defendants-Appellants 
argue that the District Court erred in failing to adopt the plan administrator‘s proposed 
approach, or at least consider it under a deferential standard of review. . . . However, the 
District Court here had no decision to review because the plan administrator never 
rendered any decision other than the original benefit determinations, all of which were 
premised on the now-impermissible ‗phantom account‘ offset mechanism. . . . (‗[W]e may 
give deferential review only to actual exercises of discretion.‘). Defendants-Appellants 
have identified no authority in support of the proposition that a district court must afford 
deference to the mere opinion of the plan administrator in a case, such as this, where the 
administrator had previously construed the same terms and we found such a construction 
to have violated ERISA.‖ Frommert v. Conkright, 535 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2008); The 
Supreme Court interpreted the court of appeals‘ reasoning in Frommert v. Conkright as 
indicating that the district court could withhold deference on remand if it previously 
determined that the plan administrator‘s interpretation of the plan violated ERISA. The 
Supreme Court found that this interpretation conflicted with the Court‘s ruling in 
Firestone, where the Court established a deferential standard of review for a plan 
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administrator‘s discretionary determinations. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). More importantly, the Supreme Court did not elaborate any 
exceptions to the deferential standard in Firestone of the type that the court of appeals 
found permissible. Id. This construction of Firestone formed the basis for the Supreme 
Court‘s rejection of the Second Circuit‘s approach. 
147 Id. at 1647.  
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1648–49 (―Here trust law does not resolve the specific issue before us, but the 
guiding principles we have identified underlying ERISA do. Congress enacted ERISA to 
ensure that employees would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not 
require employers to establish benefit plans in the first place. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 
U.S. 882, 887 (1996). We have therefore recognized that ERISA represents a ‗careful 
balancing‘ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the 
encouragement of the creation of such plans.‘ Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 
215 (2004) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 95 L. 
Ed. 2d 39 (1987)). Congress sought ‗to create a system that is [not] so complex that 
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering 
[ERISA] plans in the first place.‘ Varity Corp., supra, at 497, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 134 L. Ed. 
2d 130. ERISA ―induc[es] employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of 
liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate 
remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred. Rush Prudential HMO, 
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 153 L. Ed. 2d 375 (2002).‖). 
150 Id. at 1649. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. (―Firestone deference serves the interest of uniformity, helping to avoid a patchwork 
of different interpretations of a plan, like the one here, that covers employees in different 
jurisdictions—a result that ‗would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program 
operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and 
those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.‘‖). 
154 Id. at 1652–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (In his dissent, which Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg joined, Breyer identified ―three significant mistakes involved in this case.‖ The 
first concerned the 1989 amendment to Xerox Corporation‘s pension plan, which provided 
that the benefits of returning employees would be offset by an amount attributable to the 
lump-sum distributions the employees received when they first left Xerox. The 1989 
amendments to the plan, however, said nothing about how the plan would calculate the 
offset amount or that it would use the ―phantom account‖ method. The court of appeals 
found the plan‘s omission and continued use of the ―phantom account‖ method to be 
arbitrary and capricious and determined that the plan administrator‘s interpretation of the 
plan violated ERISA.  
 Next, he noted that the Court committed a second error by affirming the district 
court‘s acceptance of the plan administrator‘s argument that the 1989 amendments to 
Xerox‘s pension plan incorporated the ―phantom account‖ method and rejected the 
participant-petitioners‘ claim that neither the 1989 plan nor the 1989 Summary Plan 
Description said anything about the ―phantom account‖ method. The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals subsequently vacated the district court‘s decision on this issue and held that the 
plan administrator‘s interpretation of the 1989 plan as incorporating the ―phantom 
account‖ method, while in fact the plan said nothing about it, was arbitrary and capricious. 
The court of appeals instructed the district court to ―employ equitable principles when 
determining the appropriate [benefit] calculation and fashioning the appropriate remedy.‖ 
On remand, the district court determined that the appropriate remedy was to subtract out 
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the amount of participant-petitioners‘ lump-sum distributions from their recalculated total 
benefit. The court of appeals affirmed the district court‘s ruling. 
 Justice Breyer further insisted that the Supreme Court committed a third mistake in 
Conkright. Citing Firestone, the Court stated that trust law governs the standard of review 
in ERISA cases and requires courts to defer to a plan administrator‘s discretion to interpret 
a plan. However, the Court also determined that trust law was unclear on the issue of 
whether courts must defer to an administrator‘s second interpretation of a plan if the first 
interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. Justice Breyer criticized the Court‘s conclusion 
that trust law requires absolute deference to a plan administrator‘s every interpretation of a 
plan and argued that ―trust law imposes no such rigid and inflexible requirement.‖ Justice 
Breyer reasoned instead that ―the fact that trust law grants courts discretion does not mean 
that they will exercise that discretion in all instances.‖ While trust law grants the courts 
authority to defer to the trustee‘s discretion, it also permits them to craft a separate remedy 
when a trustee acts unreasonably. Accordingly, Justice Breyer argued that the district court 
acted reasonably by exercising its remedial authority to determine the method of 
calculating the participant-respondents‘ benefits. The district court initially found that the 
plan administrator abused his discretion by using the ―phantom account‖ method to adjust 
the participant-respondents‘ benefits. On remand, the district court rejected the plan 
administrator‘s other calculation method because it found that the method would violate 
ERISA‘s notice provisions. Justice Breyer concluded that the district court reasonably 
could have found it necessary to rely on its own remedial authority under the 
circumstances. Unlike the majority in Conkright, Justice Breyer would have relied on the 
principles of trust law to answer the question of whether the district court was required to 
defer to the plan administrator‘s alternative interpretation of the plan terms.  
Besides disagreeing with the Conkright majority on whether trust law provided the 
appropriate framework for analysis, Justice Breyer also dissented from the Court‘s reliance 
on ERISA-based policies to resolve the issue of whether the District Court was required to 
defer to the plan administrator‘s interpretation on remand. Justice Breyer noted that the 
policies which motivated the majority opinion, such as predictability, uniformity, and plan 
creation, are in fact offset by the Court‘s ―one free honest mistake rule‖ which encourages 
employers to draft ambiguous plans with the continued expectation of judicial deference to 
their interpretations of the plan terms. Trust law, Justice Breyer argued, provides a better 
guiding principle in ERISA cases and also leaves room for the supervising courts to decide 
―how much weight to give to a plan administrator‘s remedial opinion‖ on review. 
Finally, Breyer stated that he would have answered the second question on which the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari—whether the court of appeals properly deferred to the 
District Court on the merits. He reasoned that answering this question would depend ―on 
how one characterizes the Court of Appeals‘ decision.‖ First, if the court of appeals 
deferred to the district court‘s interpretation of the plan terms in order to determine the 
appropriate benefit calculation method, then the appropriate standard of review under 
Firestone would be de novo. If, however, the court of appeals deferred to the district 
court‘s creation of a remedy based on equitable principles, then the correct standard of 
review would be abuse of discretion. The district court‘s and the court of appeals‘ opinions 
contained language that supported either interpretation, although Justice Breyer viewed the 
court of appeals‘ decision as directed primarily to the district court‘s creation of a remedy. 
As such, Justice Breyer stated that it was appropriate for the court of appeals to review the 
district court‘s decision for abuse of discretion. The plan administrator insisted that the 
court of appeals would have been prohibited from treating the district court‘s remedy as 
anything other than an application of the plan terms because the participant-respondents 
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sought relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which permits plaintiffs only to enforce 
their rights under the terms of the plan. Breyer rejected this argument on the grounds that 
seeking relief under § 1132(a)(1)(B) does not restrict a court‘s remedial authority or 
prohibit a court from fashioning relief based on equitable principles. It may be especially 
appropriate for a court to rely on equitable principles in cases where the plan administrator 
fails to adequately notify employees of the plan terms. Justice Breyer concluded that he 
would have affirmed the court of appeals‘ decision).  
155 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,354–58 (July 23, 2010).  
156 Id. at 43,352–54. 
157 Quillen, supra note 39, at 71. 
158 Id. Unlike an insured ERISA plan, a ―self-funded [ERISA] plan does not purchase an 
insurance policy from any insurance company in order to satisfy its obligations to its 
participants.‖ FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 54 (1990). Consequently, state laws 
regulating insurance ―do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans 
may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business 
of insurance for purposes of such state laws.‖ Id. at 61.  
159 Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 602 (6th Cir. 2009). 
160 Id. at 603. 
161 Id. at 602. 
162 Id. at 604–05. 
163 Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 334 (2003). 
164 Ross, 558 F.3d at 605. 
165 Id. (quoting Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341 (2003) 
(―In Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 155 L. 
Ed. 2d 468 (2003) (hereinafter ‗Miller‘), the Supreme Court clarified the appropriate test 
to determine whether a state law regulates insurance under the ERISA savings clause. 
There, the Court held that, first, ‗the state law must be specifically directed toward entities 
engaged in insurance,‘ and, second, ‗the state law must substantially affect the risk-pooling 
arrangement between the insurer and the insured[s].‘‖). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168
 Id. at 606–07 (―First, the rules directly control the terms of insurance contracts by 
prohibiting insurers and insureds from entering into contracts that include discretionary 
clauses and prohibiting enforcement of such clauses. By changing the terms of enforceable 
insurance contracts, the Commissioner has ‗alter[ed] the scope of permissible bargains 
between insurers and insureds.‘ See Ward, 526 U.S. at 374–75 (explaining that the state 
notice-prejudice rule changed the bargain between insured and insurer because it 
effectively created a mandatory contract term that required the insurer to prove prejudice 
before enforcing a timeliness-of-claim provision); see also Benefit Recovery Inc. v. 
Donelon, 521 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the state insurance 
commissioner‘s directive prohibiting insurers from enforcing subrogation rights until 
insureds are fully compensated for their injuries alters the permissible bargains between 
insureds and insurers by telling them what bargains are acceptable). Second, under the 
rules, insurers can no longer invest the plan administrator with unfettered discretionary 
authority to determine benefit eligibility or to construe ambiguous terms of a plan. 
Prohibiting plan administrators from exercising discretionary authority in this manner 
‗dictates to the insurance company the conditions under which it must pay for the risk it 
has assumed.‘ Miller, 538 U.S. at 339 n.3. We therefore conclude that the rules regulate 
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insurance because they substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between insureds 
and insurers. As such, the rules fall within the scope of ERISA‘s savings clause.‖). 
169 Id.  
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 607–08 (―Even if a state law regulates insurance such that it falls within ERISA‘s 
savings clause, it may nevertheless be preempted by that statute‘s § 502(a) civil 
enforcement provisions. In relevant part, § 502(a) allows an ERISA plan participant or 
beneficiary to file a civil action ‗to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, 
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits 
under the terms of the plan.‘ 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, ERISA‘s civil 
enforcement provisions are the ‗sort of overpowering federal policy that overrides a 
statutory provision designed to save state law from being preempted.‘ Rush Prudential, 
536 U.S. at 375. In Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 217–18, the Supreme Court explained that 
ERISA‘s savings clause does not obviate the need for conflict preemption analysis, stating: 
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional intent to create an 
exclusive federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a). Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-
emption, then, even a state law that can arguably be characterized as ‗regulating insurance‘ 
will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, 
or in addition to, ERISA‘s remedial scheme. However, there is no state-law claim at issue 
in this case that implicates ERISA‘s civil enforcement provisions. The rules do not 
authorize any form of relief in state courts, either expressly or impliedly; they do not grant 
a plan participant the ability to ‗recover benefits under the plan, enforce his rights under 
the plan, or otherwise clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.‘ 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Put simply, the rules do not create, duplicate, supplant, or 
supplement any of the causes of action that may be alleged under ERISA. Nor is there any 
evidence that the rules serve as an alternative enforcement mechanism, outside of ERISA‘s 
civil enforcement provisions such that the rules permit a plan beneficiary to assert a claim 
that could otherwise be asserted under ERISA. Briscoe, 444 F.3d at 498. The rules at most 
may affect the standard of judicial review if, and when, such a claim is brought before a 
court. Accordingly, Michigan‘s rules do not conflict with ERISA‘s civil enforcement 
provisions; thus, they are not removed from ERISA‘s savings clause on this basis.‖). 
172 Id. at 608. 
173 Id at 608–09. 
174
 Id. at 609. 
175Metro., 554 U.S. at 116. 
176 Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2009). (―If, 
as Glenn reaffirms, there is a conflict of interest when the same plan administrator decides 
the merits of a benefits plan and pays that claim, and if, as Glenn also holds, it is consistent 
with ERISA to account for that conflict of interest in reviewing a plan administrator‘s 
decision, it is difficult to understand why a State should not be allowed to eliminate the 
potential for such a conflict of interest by prohibiting discretionary clauses in the first 
place. Nor is it necessarily the case, as the Insurance Industry suggests, that, if Michigan 
can remove discretionary clauses, it will be allowed to dictate the standard of review for all 
ERISA benefits claims. All that today‘s case does is allow a State to remove a potential 
conflict of interest. And while Michigan‘s law may well establish that the courts will give 
de novo review to lawsuits dealing with the meaning of an ERISA plan, it does not follow 
that they will do so in reviewing the application of a settled term in the plan to a given 
benefit request.‖). 
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177 Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 78 U.S.L.W. 
3667 (May 17, 2010). 
178 Id. at 840. 
179 Id. at 840–42. 
180 Id. at 841. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 842. 
185 Id. (Under Miller, a state law regulates insurance if it is specifically directed toward the 
insurance industry and substantially affects the risk pooling arrangement between insurer 
and insured). 
186 Id. at 849. 
187 Id. at 842. 
188
 Id. 
189 Id. (―We agree with the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in American Council of Life Insurers v. 
Ross, 558 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2009). In that case, the Sixth Circuit confronted a Michigan 
prohibition on discretionary clauses. It concluded, as we do, that ‗[g]iven that the rules 
impose conditions only on an insurer‘s right to engage in the business of insurance in [the 
state,] . . . the rules are directed toward entities engaged in the business of insurance.‘ Id. at 
605―); Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (―[S]tate 
laws are ‗directed toward entities engaged in insurance‘ if insurers are regulated with 
respect to their insurance practices. Id. Here, there can be no serious dispute that the rules 
meet the first prong of the Miller test because they regulate insurers with respect to 
their insurance practices. . . . Given that the rules impose conditions only on an insurer‘s 
right to engage in the business of insurance in Michigan, we conclude that the rules are 
directed towards entities engaged in the business of insurance. See Miller, 538 U.S. at 
337 (‗[The laws] regulate [] insurance by imposing conditions on the right to engage in the 
business of insurance.‘)‖). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 843. 
193 Id. 
194
 Id. at 844. 
195 Id. at 842–44 (―Standard next argues that the practice is not specifically directed at 
insurers because it merely applies ‗laws of general application that have some bearing on 
insurers.‘ Kentucky Ass‘n, 538 U.S. at 334. To Standard, the practice is nothing more than 
an attempt to apply the common-law rule that contracts are interpreted against their drafter. 
. . . Morrison‘s practice is grounded in policy concerns specific to the insurance industry, 
such as ensuring fair treatment of claims by insurers with potential conflicts of interest. It 
is indeed directed at insurance companies.‖). 
196 Id. at 844. 
197 Id. (―Insurance companies‘ core function is to accept a number of risks from 
policyholders in exchange for premiums. Some of the risks accepted will result in actual 
losses. Risk pooling involves spreading losses ‗over all the risks so as to enable the insurer 
to accept each risk.‘ Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 127–28, 102 S. Ct. 
3002, 73 L. Ed. 2d 647 & n.7 (1982). By receiving a large number of relatively small 
premiums, the insurer can afford to compensate the few insureds who suffer losses. In this 
way, the insured no longer bears more than a small amount of his own risk—it has been 
transferred into a common pool into which all members of the pool contribute by paying 
premiums. The requirement that insurance regulations substantially affect risk pooling 
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ensures that the regulations are targeted at insurance practices, not merely at insurance 
companies. See Kentucky Ass‘n, 538 U.S. at 338 (noting that, absent the risk pooling 
requirement, ‗any state law aimed at insurance companies could be deemed a law that 
regulates insurance‘ (internal quotation marks omitted)). For instance, a state law requiring 
insurers to pay their janitors twice the minimum wage would not regulate insurance 
because it would have no effect on the risk-pooling relationship between insurers and the 
insured. Id. Standard argues for a definition of risk pooling that it claims is used in the 
insurance industry. According to such definition, risk is pooled at the time the insurance 
contract is made, not at the time a claim is made.‖). 
198 Id. (Standard argued that ―[a]dministrative factors such as ‗claim investigations, the 
appeals process, and litigation‘ can ‗affect amounts paid to insureds under [a] policy,‘ but 
are outside of the risk pooling arrangement‖). Standard‘s goal in presenting this argument 
was to persuade the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that Montana‘s ban on discretionary 
clauses, by failing to satisfy the second prong of the Miller test, does not fall under the 
savings clause and is therefore preempted by ERISA. In short, Standard sought to prevent 
Commissioner Morrison‘s ban on discretionary clauses from being enforced. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 844–45 (―Montana insureds may no longer agree to a discretionary clause in 
exchange for a more affordable premium. The scope of permissible bargains between 
insurers and insureds has thus narrowed.‖). 
201 Id. at 845. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 846. 
205 Id. (quoting Aetna Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (holding that ERISA 
preempts a Texas state law which allows claimants to recover damages when an HMO 
fails to exercise ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions). 
206 Id.  
207 Id. 
208 Id. (―‗[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the 
ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the 
ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.‘ Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209. . . . 
Here, however, there is no additional remedy. Insureds may only recover the value of the 
denied claim from their insurers. The practice neither ‗authorize[s] any form of relief in 
state courts‘ nor ‗serve[s] as an alternate enforcement mechanism[ ] outside of ERISA‘s 
civil enforcement provisions.‘ Am. Council of Life Ins., 558 F.3d at 607; see also Aetna 
Health, 542 U.S. at 218 (‗[E]ven a state law . . . regulating insurance will be pre-empted if 
it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, 
ERISA‘s remedial scheme.‘ (internal quotation marks omitted)). . . . Since it adds nothing 
the ERISA scheme does not already contemplate, the practice is distinguishable from cases 
in which a state attempts to meld a new remedy to the ERISA framework.‖). If 
Commissioner Morrison‘s ban on discretionary clauses created a new remedy outside of or 
in addition to the exclusive list of remedies under ERISA Section 502 (29 U.S.C. § 1132), 
ERISA would preempt Commissioner Morrison‘s practice pursuant to § 514 (29 U.S.C. § 
1144). 
209 Id. at 847. 
210
 Id. 
211 Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2008)). 
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212 Id. (―[W]e must balance ERISA‘s preemptive scope with its ‗antiphonal‘ acceptance of 
state insurance regulation. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 364.‖). 
213 Id. (―Glenn involved an exercise of the Court‘s power to make federal common law, as 
evidenced by its frequent reference to trust law and the absence of any applicable state 
insurance regulation. The Court‘s refusal to create a system of universal de novo review 
does not necessarily mean that states are categorically forbidden from issuing insurance 
regulations with such effect. After all, the states have retained power to institute quite a 
number of rules affecting ERISA plans pursuant to their savings clause powers. See, 
e.g., Kentucky Ass‘n, 538 U.S. at 329; Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 355; UNUM Life, 526 
U.S. at 358; Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 724‖). 
214 Id. at 847–48. 
215 Id. at 848  
216 Id. at 848–49. 
217 Id. at 849 (―Although we acknowledge the tension between the Commissioner‘s 
practice and federal common law concerning the standard of review, we see nothing that 
would justify taking the extraordinary step of creating a new exclusion under the savings 
clause. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the Commissioner‘s practice of 
disapproving discretionary clauses is not preempted by ERISA‘s exclusive remedial 
scheme.‖). 
218 Hancock v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2009). 
219 Id. at 1149. 
220 Id. at 1144. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. (―[T]he Plan grant[ed] MetLife ‗discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the 
Plan and to determine eligibility for and entitlement to Plan benefits in accordance with the 
terms of the Plan.‘‖).  
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 1143–44 (Verla Hancock died in 2004. Verla‘s daughter Terri discovered her 
mother‘s body; the police report stated that a bottle of Oxycontin was found nearby. The 
medical examiner, however, listed the cause of death as undetermined because the 
toxicology results and the autopsy showed no evidence of disease, injury, or intoxication 
sufficient to explain death. Verla had designated Terri Hancock as her beneficiary under 
the plan. Ms. Hancock filed a claim for life insurance and AD & D benefits in 2005). 
228 Id. at 1144–45 (Hancock subsequently appealed the denial of benefits and cited two 
conversations she had with the investigating detective and the medical examiner, both of 
whom stated that Verla‘s death may have resulted from a slip and fall accident. MetLife 
denied the appeal on the ground that Hancock‘s evidence was conjecture and did not show 
that an accident caused Verla‘s death. Hancock submitted additional evidence in 2006 but 
MetLife never responded. Hancock then sued MetLife in Utah state court, alleging breach 
of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, among other claims. 
MetLife reaffirmed its denial of AD & D benefits just a day later and also filed a motion to 
remove the case to federal court). 
229 Id. 
230
 Id. at 1145. 
231 Id. (Hancock also argued that MetLife had a conflict of interest and made procedural 
errors in handling her claim. The district court decided each motion on the merits.) 
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232 Id.(―[The district court] denied Ms. Hancock‘s motion for partial summary judgment, 
holding that ERISA preempted Rule 590-218 and that MetLife was entitled to arbitrary-
and-capricious review.‖). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1145–46. 
236 Id. at 1146. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 1148 (―Rule 590-218 can be applied to the Plan only if it is not preempted by 
ERISA. ERISA expressly preempts any state law ‗insofar as [it] may now or hereafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan,‘ see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), unless the law ‗regulates 
insurance, banking, or securities,‘ id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The issue before us is whether Rule 
590-218 regulates insurance.‖). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. (quoting Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003)). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. (―MetLife does not dispute that Rule 590-218 satisfies Miller‘s first prong. We 
therefore turn to prong two.‖). 
245 Id. at 1149. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 1149. 
249 Id. (―If Rule 590-218 imposed a blanket prohibition on the use of discretion-granting 
clauses, we would have a different case.‖). 
250 Id. 
251 Id.; Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 333 (2003) (In order to 
determine if a practice falls within the business of insurance, it has to form ―part of the 
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.‖). 
252 Id. at 1149–50. 
253 Id. (―Ms. Hancock contends that Rule 590-218 affects risk pooling because if 
discretion-granting clause does not substantially conform to the rule‘s safe-harbor 
language, the clause is invalid, the insurer is deprived of discretion, and the resulting de 
novo review affects the risk pool by causing more reversals of benefit denials. Her 
argument proves too much. By her logic, any requirement, no matter how trivial (for 
example, a requirement that the plan be printed on mauve paper), affects risk pooling 
simply because an insurer‘s noncompliance would divest it of discretion, trigger de novo 
review, and change its risks. We decline to interpret Miller so broadly.‖). 
254 Hancock, 590 F.3d at 1150 (―The change in risk pooling must result 
from compliance with the state law, not its violation.‖). 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 1150–51 (Hancock also raised two contentions at oral argument which the Tenth 
Circuit dismissed on the merits. Hancock first argued that Rule 590-218 only permits 
insurers to restrict the scope of review but not the standard of review. Hancock asserted 
that the scope of review comprehends the material that a court may examine in evaluating 
a plan administrator‘s decision, whereas the standard of review involves the level of 
judicial deference. The Tenth Circuit rejected Hancock‘s argument as it leads to the 
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conclusion that Rule 590-218 categorically prohibits deferential review. The Court of 
Appeals rejected such an interpretation as ―nonsensical‖ in light of the rule‘s safe-harbor 
language granting the administrator discretion to interpret the plan terms and to determine 
eligibility for benefits. The Court concluded that the phrase ―scope of review‖ in the safe-
harbor language must be a reference to the extent of judicial deference to the plan 
administrator and not the materials a court may consider. Hancock also asserted at oral 
argument that the rule‘s safe-harbor provision only applies if the insurance company is the 
plan administrator. The Tenth Circuit rejected Hancock‘s argument because the rule 
plainly reserves discretion to the plan administrator or the insurance company acting as a 
plan administrator. The Court refused to interpret the safe-harbor provision in a way that 
would render the term ―plan administrator‖ redundant. The Court reiterated its holding that 
ERISA preempts Rule 590-218 because the rule has no substantial effect on risk pooling 
and fails to qualify as a law regulating insurance. The Court held that MetLife‘s 
discretionary clause was valid.) 
258
 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 1153. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 1154 (―MetLife received Ms. Hancock‘s [appeal] letter on February 13, 2006. 
Ten days later it informed her that it would be ‗willing to conduct a further administrative 
review,‘ id. at 142, provided that she agree that her submissions be part of the 
administrative record that could be reviewed by a court. On March 3 Ms. Hancock agreed 
and asked MetLife to proceed with its review. More than three months passed with no 
decision from MetLife. On June 27, 2006, Ms. Hancock‘s attorney wrote to MetLife, 
noting that he had contacted MetLife over 20 times in the previous months and was always 
told only that ‗the claim is in the review process,‘ without additional explanation. Id. at 
134. The letter threatened suit for breach of contract if Metlife did not pay the disputed 
AD&D benefits within ten days. On September 12 Ms. Hancock, still without a decision 
on her appeal, filed suit. MetLife denied Ms. Hancock‘s second appeal the next day. The 
denial letter stated that it only supplemented the first appeal-denial letter and did not 
replace it. It again cited the Plan‘s AD&D provision and summarized MetLife‘s reasons 
for denying the claim and the first appeal. It then stated that the MRA report ‗d[id] not 
demonstrate with certainty that the decedent had an accident‘ and that the slip-meter test 
said nothing about Verla Hancock‘s actual cause of death. Id. at 132. From this 
correspondence we cannot conclude that MetLife denied Ms. Hancock a full and fair 
review. MetLife did not ignore her evidence; it merely found it inconclusive. Both appeal-
denial letters took into account the information Ms. Hancock had submitted and then 
reasonably explained why the information was insufficient to support the accidental-death 
theory.‖). 
263 Id. (―Ordinarily, we review discretionary benefit decisions under an arbitrary-and-
capricious standard. See Kellogg, 549 F.3d at 825. But if the plan administrator or 
fiduciary operates under a conflict of interest, we decrease our deference in proportion to 
the seriousness of the conflict. See Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 
1004 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). At one time we distinguished between standard 
conflicts and inherent conflicts to determine how much deference to withhold. If the 
conflict was standard—that is, if the fiduciary‘s or administrator‘s ‗dual role jeopardized 
[its] impartiality,‘ id. at 1005 (internal quotation marks omitted)—and the claimant could 
not establish that the conflict was serious, we considered the conflict as one factor in 
determining whether the benefit denial was arbitrary and capricious, see id. But if the 
conflict was inherent—for example, if the administrator of the plan was also its insurer—
the burden shifted to the conflicted party to prove that its decision was not arbitrary and 
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capricious. See id. at 1006.‖). This approach arose out of the Court of Appeals‘ uncertainty 
as to how to apply the Supreme Court‘s holding in Firestone that a conflict of interest must 
be taken into account on review of a discretionary benefit denial. The approach in the 
Tenth Circuit had been to withhold some degree of deference and shift the burden to the 
conflicted party to prove that its benefit determination had not been arbitrary and 
capricious.  
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 1156. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 See generally Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §503, 88 
Stat 829, 893 (1974). 
270 Id. at § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
271
 In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) the Supreme Court held that 
state external review processes were not preempted by ERISA. These procedures do not 
apply to self-insured plans. 
272 As one might expect, there are a number of ways in which a plan can lose its 
grandfathered status. 
273 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119. 
274 I am indebted to Colleen Medill for the following summary of the model act. See 
Medill, Instructor‘s Note to Student Supplemental Materials (Fall 2010), 2010, at 
http://www.medill-employee-benefits.com/display.asp?displayID=Fall2010SS.pdf. ―Under 
the Model Act, the participant must first exhaust the plan‘s internal grievance procedure 
and receive a final adverse determination of the claim before seeking external independent 
review of the plan administrator‘s decision. Model Act section 7. The participant must file 
a request for external independent review with the state insurance commissioner. Model 
Act section 8. Among the consumer protections provided by the Model Act, the 
independent reviewer must be an expert in the treatment of the participant‘s medical 
condition that is the subject of the participant‘s claim. If a physician serves as an external 
reviewer, the physician must be currently licensed and be certified by a recognized 
American medical specialty board in the area or areas that are the subject of the review. 
Model Act section 3B. The participant may submit additional written information to the 
independent reviewer to support the participant‘s claim that was not initially submitted to 
the plan‘s administrator. In rendering an opinion, the independent reviewer is not bound by 
the prior judgments or opinions of the plan administrator. The decision of the independent 
external reviewer is binding on the plan administrator and cannot be appealed through 
litigation. Model Act section 11.‖ 
275 According to BNA, forty-four states currently have some kind of external review 
procedure in place. All states have until July 1, 2011 to amend their procedures to comply 
with NAIC‘s model act. Administration Issues Rules Strengthening Health Plan Coverage 
Appeals Process, 37 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) No. 29 at 1628. July 27, 2010. 
276 Section 2719 of the Public Health Service Act, as amended by Section 1001 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, requires group health plans and health 
insurance issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage to provide an 
external review process that, ―at a minimum, includes the consumer protections set forth in 
the Uniform External Review Model Act promulgated by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners and is binding on such plans.‖ Patient Protection and Affordable 
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Care Act, § 1001. Plans and issuers must comply with the applicable State or Federal 
external review process. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,356 (July 23, 2010). 
 Generally, if a State external review process that applies to and is binding on an issuer 
offering group health insurance coverage includes ―at a minimum the consumer 
protections in the NAIC Uniform Model Act, then the issuer must comply with the 
applicable State external review process and is not required to comply with the Federal 
external review process‖ that is set forth in the regulations. Id. Group health plans do not 
have to comply with either the State or Federal external review process to the extent that 
the benefits they offer are provided through group health insurance coverage. Id. However, 
if a group health plan offers benefits other than through health insurance coverage (e.g. if 
the plan is self-insured) and is subject to a State external review process that is not 
preempted by ERISA and includes at a minimum the consumer protections in the NAIC 
Uniform Model Act, then the plan must comply with the applicable State external review 
process and is not required to comply with the Federal external review process. Id. The 
Department of Health and Human Services will determine whether the applicable State 
external review process contains all the minimum consumer protections in the NAIC 
Uniform Model Act. Id. Minimum standards for State external review processes include, 
among others, effective written notice to participants about their rights to external review, 
shifting the cost of an independent review organization (IRO) onto the plan or issuer 
against whom a request for external review is filed, random IRO assignment, exclusion of 
IROs with conflicts of interest, and no minimum claim threshold for the claim to be 
eligible for external review. Id. at 43,356–57. 
277 If a plan or issuer does not have to comply with a State external review process, then 
the plan or issuer must comply with the federal external review process that is set forth in 
the regulations. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers 
Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,357 (July 23, 2010). 
278 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008) (―Where the plan provides 
to the contrary by granting ‗the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to 
determine eligibility for benefits,‘ Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added), ‗[t]rust 
principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate,‘ . . .‖); Holmstrom v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2010) (―Judicial review of an ERISA 
administrator‘s benefits determination is de novo unless the plan grants the administrator 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the 
plan. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (1989). When the administrator has such discretionary 
authority, as the vast majority now do, the court applies a more deferential standard, 
seeking to determine only whether the administrator‘s decision was ‗arbitrary and 
capricious.‘ . . . The plan here provided such discretionary authority, so we review under 
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.‖). 
279 See Holmstrom v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 758, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2010) (―This 
case illustrates the difficult problems presented by claims for disability insurance by 
people with serious and painful conditions that do not have objectively measurable 
symptoms. Plaintiff Lanette Holmstrom . . . participated in an employee welfare benefit 
plan administered by defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (‗MetLife‘). . . . In 
late 1999, Holmstrom sought the care of Dr. Eric Lomax to treat pain, numbness, and 
tingling she experienced in her right upper arm. In January 2000, Holmstrom had surgery 
to remedy a right ulnar nerve compression and neuropathy. The surgery provided little 
relief, and her symptoms soon worsened. In June 2000, she had another surgery to relieve 
what was thought to be nerve compression. Her symptoms worsened further after this 
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second procedure, prompting her to visit a pain clinic. The clinic doctors diagnosed CRPS 
Type I, a chronic neurological syndrome characterized by severe pain. In March 2002, 
Holmstrom underwent a third surgery, which also failed to relieve her symptoms. She saw 
another pain specialist, Dr. Weber. According to MetLife‘s records, Dr. Weber ‗made a 
definitive diagnosis of . . . complex regional pain syndrome.‘ It was clear to Holmstrom 
and her doctors that surgery could do nothing to help her, leaving medication as her only 
recourse. Holmstrom‘s pain medication regimen has included a variety of powerful drugs, 
including Amitriptyline, Bextra, Clonidine, methadone, MS Contin, MSIR, Neurontin, 
Oxycontin, Oxycodone, Oxyfast, Percocet, Topamax, and (prior to its recall) Vioxx. 
Holmstrom‘s symptoms persisted without improvement for the next three years. MetLife‘s 
records from 2003 describe a ‗high pain med[ication] regimen‘ causing side effects such as 
confusion and memory loss, and pain of such intensity that Holmstrom was ‗considering 
having nerve severed since all other kinds of pain management techniques have failed.‘ 
The record reveals no improvement through 2004 and 2005. Dr. Ted Vant, who has been 
Holmstrom‘s treating physician from 2004 to the time of this lawsuit, prescribed 
significant doses of strong medications in an attempt to manage her symptoms.‖). 
280 Interim Final Rules on Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to 
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,562–65 (June 17, 2010). 
281 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,354 (July 23, 2010). 
282 Interim Final Rules on Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to 
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,564–65 (June 17, 2010). 
283 ―Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and title 
IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(a)] and not exempt 
under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)].‖ 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2010). 
284 Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003). 
285 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 364–65 (2002). 
286 Id. at 402 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
287 Id. (―For the reasons noted by the Court, independent review provisions may sound 
very appealing. Efforts to expand the variety of remedies available to aggrieved 
beneficiaries beyond those set forth in ERISA are obviously designed to increase the 
chances that patients will be able to receive treatments they desire, and most of us are 
naturally sympathetic to those suffering from illness who seek further options. 
Nevertheless, the Court would do well to remember that no employer is required to 
provide any health benefit plan under ERISA and that the entire advent of managed care, 
and the genesis of HMOs, stemmed from spiraling health costs. To the extent that 
independent review provisions such as 4-10 make it more likely that HMOs will have to 
subsidize beneficiaries‘ treatments of choice, they undermine the ability of HMOs to 
control costs, which, in turn, undermines the ability of employers to provide health care 
coverage for employees. As a consequence, independent review provisions could create a 
disincentive to the formation of employee health benefit plans, a problem that Congress 
addressed by making ERISA‘s remedial scheme exclusive and uniform. While it may well 
be the case that the advantages of allowing States to implement independent review 
requirements as a supplement to the remedies currently provided under ERISA outweigh 
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this drawback, this is a judgment that, pursuant to ERISA, must be made by Congress. I 
respectfully dissent.‖). 
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